Many
of China’s space capabilities are designed to counter U.S. military advantages.
By Harsh
Vasani*
In
the highly “informatized” and technologically advanced battles that
characterize the 21st century, outer space will play a dominant role. Space
assets direct military operations and help in making crucial battleground
decisions. In this regard, attempts to weaponize space and command this sphere
are to be expected from great powers. The United States and USSR started
weaponizing space in the in the 1950s and 1960s respectively, and China is now
following suit.
What
Is the “Weaponization” of Space?
The
weaponization of space includes placing weapons in outer space or on
heavenly bodies as well as creating weapons that will transit outer space or
simply travel from Earth to attack or destroy targets in space. Examples
include the placing of orbital or suborbital satellites with the intention
of attacking enemy satellites, using ground-based direct ascent missiles to
attack space assets, jamming signals sent from enemy satellites, using lasers
to incapacitate enemy satellites, plasma attacks, orbital ballistic missiles,
and satellite attacks on Earth targets. These can be further classified into
direct-energy and kinetic-energy weapons.
The
weaponization of space is different from the militarization of space, which
includes using space-based assets for C4ISR (Command, Control, Communications,
Computers, Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance). The militarization
of space assists armies on the conventional battlefield, whereas via the
weaponization of space, outer space itself emerges as the battleground,
sometimes referred to as the “fourth frontier of war.”
Today’s
space-faring nations use their Ballistic Missile Defense (BMD) Systems, which
include long-range ICBMs, as an auxiliary system capable of destroying
space-based assets. The difference between BMD and ASATs lies mainly in
the software and control algorithms used to detect, track, and home in on a
satellite as compared to a warhead. China has been making impressive headway in its ICBM program and
in theory, these ICBMs can target U.S. Intelligence, Surveillance, and
Reconnaissance (ISR) satellites. There have been debates among scholars on the utility of
BMD system as ASAT (Anti-Satellite) weapons. However, Brian Weeden of the Secure
World Foundation asserts that there is no
meaningful difference between a midcourse ballistic missile defense system and
a hit-to-kill ASAT weapon.
Weeden
argues that “because midcourse ballistic missile systems are intended to
destroy warheads traveling at speeds and altitudes comparable to those of
satellites, all midcourse ballistic missile defense systems have inherent ASAT
capabilities.” He asserts that these BMD systems are more effective as
anti-satellite weapons than as missile defense systems, since most satellites
are easier to detect, track, and target than warheads, which are likely to be
accompanied with penetration aids designed to confuse a potential defense. The
difference between BMD and ASATs lies mainly in the software and control
algorithms used to detect, track, and home in on a satellite as compared to a
warhead.
China’s
Space Program
In
June 2013, Chinese President Xi Jinping spoke to astronauts at the launch of
the Shenzhou X manned mission and said that China will take bigger steps
in space exploration in pursuit of its “space dream.” He acknowledged that the space dream is part of the dream to make China stronger. “With
the development of space programs, Chinese people will take bigger strides to
explore further into space,” he said. In another occasion, on April 24, 2016,
marking China’s first “space day,” the president asked scientists to help
realize China’s dream of becoming a global space giant. In both the
instances, the Chinese president seemed to have benign intentions behind
China’s space modernization and ambitions; however, open source literature
available on China’s space dreams points out that the Chinese strategic
community sees space as the ultimate high ground, the key to military success
on the terrestrial battlefield.
Washington
believes that underlying the various civilian aspects of China’s space program
is an active military component. A 2015 report prepared by the U.S. Department of Defense suggests
that China has invested in advanced space capabilities, with particular
emphasis on “satellite communication (SATCOM), intelligence, surveillance, and
reconnaissance (ISR), satellite navigation (SATNAV), and meteorology, as well
as manned, unmanned, and interplanetary space exploration.” The report claims
that along with its civilian space program, China continues to develop a
variety of capabilities designed to limit or prevent the use of space-based
assets by adversaries during a crisis or conflict, including the “development
of directed-energy weapons and satellite jammers.”
A report prepared for the U.S.-China Economic and Security Review
Commission states that the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) recognizes
that in a time of war it must deny enemies the use of strategic information
about troop and ship movements, incoming missiles, navigation, communication,
etc, along with depriving its opponents the use of C4ISR systems. The report
goes on to state that “Chinese analysts assess that the employment of
space-based C4ISR capabilities by potential adversaries, especially the United
States, requires the PLA to develop capabilities to attack space systems. Based
on this assessment, Chinese analysts surmise that the loss of critical sensor
and communications capabilities could imperil the U.S. military’s ability to
achieve victory or to achieve victory with minimal casualties.”
There
is considerable merit in Washington’s claims about the dual-use nature of
China’s space program. For instance, Colonel Li Daguang, writing in his book Space
War published by National Defense University in 2001, recommends that the
Chinese should combine military and civilian technology and integrate peacetime
and wartime facilities. His rationale was that space equipment is costly to
develop and maintain, hence it is important to have civil-use technology that
can also have military applications.
Evolution
of China’s ASAT Weapons Capability
A
brief survey of recent tests by Beijing confirms that China is rapidly
improving its counter space program and making advances in its anti-satellite
systems. China’s first ASAT test was conducted in May 2005 and its
capabilities have come a long way since. Most notably, a 2007 test
destroyed a redundant Feng Yun 1-C weather satellite owned by China,
leaving over 3,000 dangerous pieces of debris in space. The test was
conducted in low Earth orbit (LEO), approximately 800 kilometers above Earth.
A
2013 test by Beijing involved its new missile, the DN-2 or Dong Neng-2, and the
test was conducted in “nearly geosynchronous orbit,” where most of the United
States’ ISR satellites are located. The direct ascent test, launched from
Xichang, reached an altitude of 18,600 miles. On October 30, 2015, China tested the DN-3
exoatmospheric vehicle, reported to be able to destroy U.S. satellites. Chinese
press reports said the test was a missile defense interceptor flight test. However, The Washington Free Beacon quotes unnamed defense officials as saying that the
DN-3 is “primarily a direct-ascent missile designed to ram into satellites and
destroy them, even if intelligence assessments hold that the weapon has some
missile defense capabilities.”
Along
with direct-ascent ASAT weapons, China is also believed to be developing other
space weapons. In June 2016, China launched the Aolong-1 spacecraft on a
Long March 7 rocket. China claims that the Aolong-1 is tasked with cleaning up
space junk and collecting man-made debris in space. However, other reports
suggest that the spacecraft, equipped with a robotic arm, is a dual-use ASAT
weapon. The Aolong-1 is believed to be the first in a series of spacecraft
that will be tasked with collecting man-made space debris. Quoting an unnamed researcher with the National Astronomical Observatories in
Beijing, the South China Morning Post points out that it is
unrealistic to remove all space debris with robots; rather, for the People’s
Liberation Army the robot is a potential ASAT weapon.
Beijing’s
recent space activities indicate that it is developing
co-orbital anti-satellite systems to target U.S. space assets. Co-orbital
anti-satellite systems consist of a satellite “armed with a weapon such as an
explosive charge, fragmentation device, kinetic energy weapon, laser, radio
frequency weapon, jammer, or robotic arm.” Besides the “hard-kill” methods,
Beijing is also testing soft-kill methods to incapacitate enemy satellites. For
instance, China has been acquiring a number of foreign and indigenous ground-based satellite jammers
since the mid-2000s. These jammers are designed to disrupt an adversary’s
communications with a satellite by overpowering the signals being sent to or
from it. The PLA can use these jammers to deny an adversary the access to the
GPS and other satellite signals. Directed energy lasers are also a soft-kill
method that could be used in an anti-satellite mission. China has been
committing resources to the research and development for directed energy
weapons since the 1990s.
China’s
Counterspace Program: Aimed at the U.S.
The
Chinese believe that the greatest threat to them comes from the United States. To
counter the United States’ conventional strength and gain strategic parity,
Chinese strategists believe, Beijing will need to strike at the U.S.
Achilles heel — Washington’s over-reliance on satellites for C4ISR. Beijing
plans to exploit the vulnerable space infrastructure of the United States in
the case of a war.
According
to a recent RAND report, space and counterspace operations
would be important elements in any armed confrontation between the United
States and China. The transformational warfighting capabilities that U.S.
military forces have developed since the end of the Cold War are largely
enabled by “satellite support, and space-based ISR and communication
connectivity would be especially important in the broad expanses of the Western
Pacific theater.”
The
PLA’s interest in the use of space for military purposes gained momentum after
the 1991 Gulf War, which has been referred to as the “first space war,” and has
only increased since. According to some Chinese analysts, “the U.S. military relies upon space
for 70‒80 percent of its
intelligence and 80 percent of its communication.” Some Chinese writings also
attribute an almost omnipotent quality to U.S. space-based intelligence,
surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) and conclude that the U.S. receives
exquisite intelligence from these platforms.
According
to Martin France and Richard Adams, however, “The PLA’s
development of ASAT weapons is primarily not a reaction to U.S. space control
initiatives. It is driven instead by very practical considerations of regional
security and influence, and the desire to conduct asymmetric warfare against a
superior foe if conflict arises.”
France
and Adams believe that Beijing seeks to offset the dominance of U.S.
conventional forces by exploiting their dependence on spaceborne information
assets. China also hopes to guarantee the viability of its nuclear deterrent by
holding the critical space-segment of American missile defense systems at risk.
Finally, the Chinese space program also contributes to the PLA’s
anti-access/area denial (A2/AD) capabilities by providing critical C4ISR
support to long-range precision strike weapons and providing the ability to
threaten U.S. space-based assets.
The
DN-2 2013 test jolted Washington and made the United States realize that
crucial national security satellites, parked in geostationary earth orbit, are
well within the reach of Beijing. As a response, Pentagon announced the launch
of a “Space War Center” to counter threats from China and Russia in space, part
of a $5 billion boost in space security spending for the Department of Defense.
However, over a year and a half later, precious little has come of the Center.
The
United States, aware of the enormity of the threat, needs to do a lot more to
ensure that space remains a sanctuary instead of turning into a battleground. China
and Russia have been pushing for a debate on a Prevention of an Arms Race
in Outer Space (PAROS) treaty, which would ensure that states observe a
prohibition on space weaponization. Russia and China have also submitted a
draft treaty to the UN preventing the placement of weapons in outer
space. However, in all likelihood, the United States would not want an
arms-control treaty if it means limiting the U.S. National Missile Defense
system (which has de facto ASAT applications).Washington withdrew
from the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty in 2001 and went on to develop ground
and sea-based missile defenses that can also act as ASAT weapons. So far
the biggest boulder to an international treaty bringing more transparency and
arms control to outer space is the United States.
*Harsh
Vasani is a Postgraduate Research Scholar at the Department of Geopolitics and
International Relations, Manipal University.
Photo:
A Long March 7 rocket, China's new model carrier rocket, lifts off from the
launch pad in Wenchang, Hainan province, China (June 25, 2016). Image
Credit: China Daily via REUTERS
*The
Diplomat
Read
more in The Diplomat
Sem comentários:
Enviar um comentário