A
look into Sinpo and Mayang-do: the keys to North Korea’s ongoing search for a
ballistic missile submarine.
By Damen
Cook – The Diplomat
North
Korea’s submarine force is one of the more capable wings of its generally
decrepit military. The current force’s strength lies mostly in its numbers —
North Korea possesses roughly 70 submarines in all, roughly 40 of which are
its newest Shark-class vessels. (Though still dangerous to its
adversaries, even the Shark-class reflects pretty dated technology.) With that number, the DPRK can and
does crowd its coasts with torpedo-armed or mine-laying submarines,
establishing a respectable anti-surface capability near its waters. Though most
of its submarine force is old, loud, or both, still North Korea tinkers on,
boldly determined to achieve a reliable sea-based nuclear deterrent.
To
this effect, the DPRK is building the new Gorae-class submarine (or Sinpo-class)
and testing Submarine-Launched Ballistic Missiles (SLBMs) accordingly. Remarkably,
most of this activity and materiel are headquartered within a few kilometers of
each other in the city of Sinpo and the nearby Mayang-Do Naval Base. Shipyards
for the new Gorae-class, SLBM research and development facilities, many or
most of the DPRK’s east coast submarines, and the only known ground-based
launch platforms for SLBM tests — all are located along the same 35 square
kilometer stretch of the North Korean coast. A well-coordinated first
strike on this facility would hamstring the North’s submarine fleet, its
submarine building capacity, and its hopes of a credible naval nuclear
deterrent all in one go.
Significance
Sinpo,
a small city bordering the Sea of Japan, has been building North Korean
submarines for decades. Sinpo’s shipyards churned out dozens of the
aforementioned Shark-class submarines in the 1990s, and are now
constructing more of the newest Gorae-class as well. (Nuclear missile
submarines are generally larger than their conventional counterparts — Gorae,
not incidentally, is Korean for “whale.”) As Joe Bermudez, a renowned expert on
North Korean military matters, reported — twice —
this particular vessel may very well undergo more testing and tweaking before
more are built. In light of Sinpo’s history with the Shark-class, its
current status as headquarters for the Gorae, and the overall prominence
of submarines within the DPRK Navy, North Korea undoubtedly regards Sinpo as
one of its most valuable shipbuilding sites.
Not
content with the prospect of a mobile, surface-launched ICBM capability, North
Korea is simultaneously — albeit much more slowly — working toward a sea-based
nuclear deterrent. Crafting a reliable SLBM is a long, arduous process, full of
tests, setbacks, and incremental improvement. Lamentably, however, North Korean
ballistic missile development is progressing much faster than historical precedent
would suggest, thanks in large part to newly unemployed Soviet scientists traveling to
Pyongyang as the Cold War ended. Still, rigorous testing is necessary for new
models to be considered remotely reliable, and the North has yet to come near
this threshold in its SLBM program.
A
very poor test of an infant SLBM program could result in substantial damage to
the submarine itself. To avoid any such potential and costly destruction, North
Korea has constructed a land-based SLBM launch platform at Sinpo, barely a
kilometer away from the Gorae’s submarine pen. We believe this to be
the only such facility heretofore identified by open-source intelligence. Destroying
it — and the Gorae next door — would deliver a crushing body blow to
the North’s SLBM program.
Whether
North Korea could realistically achieve a working long-range, nuclear SLBM by
2025 remains in serious doubt. Actually producing a functioning naval nuclear
deterrent is several other matters entirely. The Gorae-class subs would
need to be both quiet and capable of traveling the length of the Pacific Ocean
to get into range of the United States, and both of these prospects seem a ways
off. Once the vessel design is perfected, North Korea would need to produce at
least six such submarines to maintain a continuous, credible deterrent. Then
there’s the need for reliable command, control, and communications
infrastructure, all of which would need to markedly improve on current
conditions. North Korea remains rather far from a sea-based deterrent; one
successful strike on Sinpo could set them back many more years.
Scanning
a satellite photograph (dated December 2016) of Sinpo’s naval facilities and
the Mayang-Do Naval Base not three kilometers off the coast, I personally
counted over 25 docked submarines. Satellite imagery from March and May of that
year do not reveal quite so many, but still well over a dozen are clearly
visible. Most of these were the older, less capable Yono- and Romeo-class
models. Still: the quantity of submarines facing simultaneous destruction is
more than high enough to warrant attention; these smaller submarines can be
used to traffic North Korean Special Ops into South Korean territory; the brand
new Gorae lies within two kilometers of the other clustered
submarines; and the research, testing, and naval support facilities add
substantially to the base’s strategic value.
Predictably,
a surprise strike would be practically necessary to eliminate all of these
assets in one fell swoop. The DPRK would be expected to disperse their
submarines during times of heightened tension. (Note that the satellite images
from March 2016 — taken during the annual U.S.-South Korea military exercises —
show fewer submarines than in December.) A surprise strike could effectively
cripple the North Korean East Sea Fleet; recall that submarines are the
backbone of the DPRK Navy. Mayang-Do is one of but two east coast submarine
bases, and Sinpo is the flagship of the North’s SLBM program.
Vulnerability
Rarely
in military strategy do significance and vulnerability pair as smoothly
together as they do at Sinpo and Mayang-Do. Generally, a base’s significance
bestows upon it a certain vulnerability, for shrewd adversaries tend to strike
their opponent’s center of gravity. This can then be ameliorated with physical
fortifications, air defense networks, missile defense systems, secrecy, and so
on. But truly, little in North Korea is “well defended” by modern military
standards.
Sinpo
and its related military facilities lie within close range of Toksan and Iwon
air bases, both loaded with MiG-21 fighter aircraft. North Korea possesses
several sophisticated or pseudo-sophisticated air defense systems, from the
ancient SA-2 to the more modern KN-06. The KN-06 is very similar to the Russian
S-300 and the Chinese HQ-9, the latter itself also being curiously similar to
the S-300. This makes the KN-06 North Korea’s most advanced surface-to-air
missile to date and the most plausible threat against American or allied aircraft.
The KN-06 is still undergoing testing, however, and it is unclear how many
batteries the North plans to produce.
As
of right now, MiG-21s and S-200s look to be the most likely defenders of Sinpo
and Mayang-Do. These platforms represent no real threat to the U.S., South
Korean, or Japanese air forces. In Operation Desert Storm, American F-15s made
quick work of Iraqi MiG-21s, 23s, 29s, and Su-25s. North Korea does not
currently operate a single aircraft better than those the United States easily
defeated over 25 years ago. Perhaps the North Korean Air Force or its SAMs
would get lucky and destroy a few U.S. aircraft. Perhaps they get really lucky
and slay a few more. Unless they can somehow shoot down most of the planes
involved in a first strike — possibly including stealthy F-22s and B-2s or
pseudo-stealthy F-35s — and intercept the cruise missiles fired from American
and allied ships, the North Koreans would not be able to defend their base from
utter destruction.
Conclusion
A
strike on Sinpo and the island of Mayang-Do would be a tactician’s dream. One
full salvo on the submarines stationed there (and their supportive
infrastructure) could constitute the most brutally efficient military operation
of the next Korean War. The risk-reward ratio dramatically favors the
aggressor. Esteemed professionals — two former secretaries of defense, for example — have
called for preventative strikes against North Korean military facilities. That
is not what I am doing here. But should an aggressor choose to target Sinpo in
such a wave, they could simultaneously cripple much of North Korea’s submarine
force and slam its SLBM program to a halt.
Images
- Source: Strategic Sentinel
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