North
Korea isn’t the first Asian communist state to acquire a nuclear ICBM
capability of concern to the United States.
By Yevgen
Sautin | The Diplomat
As
U.S. policymakers ponder how to deal with North Korea’s nuclear and missile
programs, it is important to remember that we are not in uncharted territory. The
United States found itself in a similar situation more than 50 years ago,
when faced with the prospect of Maoist China going nuclear. Then as now,
experts questioned if rational decision makers were behind the nuclear controls
of a reclusive communist state and military options — no matter how risky —
were seriously considered. Despite initially having great fears about the
prospect of a nuclear China, both the Kennedy and the Johnson administrations
came to realize that China’s modest nuclear arsenal failed to alter the
underlying balance of power in East Asia or undermine the confidence of U.S.
allies in the credibility of Washington’s security guarantees. And even though
nuclear-armed China continued to champion global revolutionary causes and
provide direct military assistance to North Vietnam against the United States,
Chinese rhetoric on nuclear weapons gradually moderated and began to show
evidence of calculated restraint vis-à-vis the United States.
A
Rogue China
In
December of 1960, the U.S. National Intelligence Estimate (NIE) warned that,
“[China’s] arrogant self-confidence, revolutionary fervor, and distorted view
of the world may lead [Beijing] to miscalculate risks. This danger would be
heightened if Communist China achieved a nuclear weapons capability.” Revolutionary
fervor aside, the same assessment could be written about North Korea today. North
Korea continues to be one of the most isolated regimes in the world, run by the
mercurial Kim Jong-un. In addition, the country engages in kidnappings and
assassinations, hurls utterly bizarre imprecations against the United States,
and regularly threatens preemptive nuclear strikes against South Korea. When
observing North Korea from afar it is easy to mistake it for an exceptional
case of obdurate despotism.
As
the NIE suggests, however, the same rogue state description fit the profile of
China in the 1960s. Throughout the decade, Chinese leaders routinely dismissed
the dangers of nuclear war and would stress the inevitable victory of the
“people’s war” against U.S. imperialism and Soviet revisionism. At the same
time, Chinese leaders greatly exaggerated the capabilities of their own nuclear
program and downplayed
the risks posed by potential counter force strikes against the Chinese
mainland.
In
reality, China’s belligerent rhetoric was a strategic bluff to compensate for
the great disparity between China and the two superpowers in nuclear
capabilities. When looking today at uncannily similar boasts by North Korean
state press that their country is now “a strong nuclear power state” and has “a very powerful ICBM
that can strike any place in the world” it is important to remember that North
Korea continues to have a small nuclear arsenal, has no second strike
capability, and will never be able to shift the military power balance in the
region on its own. North Korean saber rattling is a screen to deflect from the
regime’s weakness and fear of the future.
North
Korea’s Nuclear Doctrine
The
DPRK does not have a publicly available official nuclear doctrine, which leaves
analysts the sole option of piecing together a strategy from open-source
statements. Kim Jong-un has spoken about the importance of breaking the “nuclear monopoly” held by the United States. Pyongyang
has stated that it has a “no first use” policy and that it is in favor of complete
global disarmament. Despite the “no first use” language, North Korea has
repeatedly threatened to use nuclear weapons in preventive strikes against
either the United States or South Korea. Since pulling out of the Six
Party Talks, North Korea has effectively rejected efforts to denuclearize the
North Korean peninsula.
North
Korea’s commentary on nuclear weapons closely parallels China’s official
positions on nuclear weapons during the 1960s. Following China’s first nuclear
test in 1964, Beijing also stressed three points: China’s goal for developing
nuclear weapons was “to break the superpower monopoly;” China holds a “no first
use” policy; and that China supports the complete elimination of nuclear
weapons. Despite the cautious public stance, China was vehemently opposed to
the Limited Test Ban Treaty (LTBT) and did not moderate its hostile position
toward nonproliferation until its nuclear program reached a more mature stage
in the 1970s. China’s record suggests that North Korea is purposely adopting a
hostile stance to compensate for the overall weakness of the North Korean
arsenal.
Dealing
with North Korea Effectively
As
William Burr and Jeffrey T. Richelson document in Whether to “Strangle the
Baby in the Cradle”: The United States and the Chinese Nuclear Program, 1960-64,
John F. Kennedy viewed a potential Chinese nuclear test as “likely to be
historically the most significant and worst event of the 1960s.” The Kennedy
Administration was so concerned about the specter of a nuclear China that every
measure from direct U.S. strikes to parachuting Chinese Nationalist commandos
from Taiwan was considered. Kennedy even authorized officials to approach
America’s archrival, the Soviet Union, regarding joint preventive action
against China.
Kennedy
was hardly alone in his fears that a nuclear China was the greatest threat to
world peace. As the Cultural Revolution unfolded, the U.S. Navy was concerned
that China would quickly gain submarine-launched ballistic missile (SLBM)
technology and would launch them in a way to fake a Soviet strike, triggering a
global nuclear war. (See Lyle J. Goldstein in When China Was a ‘Rogue
State’: The Impact of China’s Nuclear Weapons Program on US-China Relations
during the 1960s.) To counter this putative threat, the Navy recommended
the sinking of China’s first missile-armed submarine on its maiden voyage. Not
only did these fears border on paranoia, they greatly exaggerated China’s
technological capabilities. In the case of SLBMs, China would not test its
first submarine-launched missile until 1982. The press was also highly critical
of Mao possessing nuclear weapons and called for military action to curtail
Beijing’s nuclear ambitions.
Kennedy’s
fears over the prospect of China going nuclear were not shared by everyone in
government. The State Department’s Policy Planning Council produced an
influential study that questioned the consequence of China’s nuclear test. The
study argued that the Chinese nuclear arsenal could not pose a major threat to
the United States and would hardly alter the balance of power in the region. Moreover,
China’s nuclear arsenal was vulnerable to a U.S. counter force strike. Hence, a
nuclear China would not feel emboldened to further challenge the United States.
Although initially controversial, proponents of this view eventually won out in
the Johnson administration.
The
report acknowledged that there could be some adverse political ramifications of
a Chinese nuclear test (i.e., proliferation), but they could be addressed by
U.S. reassurances to its allies. Indeed, even though in the wake of China’s
first nuclear test Japan expressed a strong desire to develop its own bomb, the
Johnson administration was able to provide security reassurances combined with
diplomatic pressure to dissuade Tokyo from going down the nuclear path. In the
subsequent years, the United States applied similar pressure to block Taiwan
and South Korea from going forward with their own nuclear weapons programs.
If
China’s nuclear program did not pose a serious threat to the United States in
the 1960s, then there is even less reason to fear North Korea’s today. Even
with improvements in North Korean missile capabilities, the United States and
its allies still enjoy an overwhelming military and economic advantage over the
North. Just as during the 1960s, the United States simply needs to be public
and credible in its reassurances to its regional allies and partners. Any North
Korean effort to split the U.S.-ROK alliance will fail if the United States
continues to provide a broad security guarantee to South Korea. As long as the
Trump administration continues to offer its public support to Japan, Tokyo too
will feel that there is no need for drastic action.
Lastly
the United States needs to forcefully come out against the linkage of the North
Korean nuclear question with unrelated issues in the U.S.-China relationship to
address Taiwanese concerns that Washington will trade away the de facto independence
of the island in exchange for Chinese assistance in reigning in North Korea. It
has become clear that either due to a lack of leverage or deliberate
unwillingness, Beijing will not apply the necessary level of pressure to compel
Pyongyang to reverse course. The United States should not fall into the
trap of expanding the scope of talks in the hope of eliciting additional
Chinese cooperation on North Korea.
Conclusion
After
the 1964 Chinese nuclear test, President Johnson used trade controls and extra
intelligence monitoring to slow down the pace of China’s nuclear development. Despite
continued apprehension, the U.S. learned to live with China’s nuclear program. This
was made possible in large part due to swift and credible U.S. reassurances to
key regional allies such as Japan. Over time, as Chinese leaders decided to
shift strategies and pursue greater engagement with the Western world, China’s
nuclear positions underwent a gradual evolution. North Korea is not China, but
a similar policy of strategic patience combined with robust security assurances
to South Korea and Japan is the best bet for getting North Korea back to the
negotiating table. The alternative is untenable.
*Yevgen
Sautin is a Gates Scholar at Cambridge University working on a Ph.D. in
modern Chinese history.
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