sexta-feira, 25 de março de 2016

PD DIAK LIU SAI HO DIGNIDADE…!!!


Jornal Nacional, editorial

Partido CNRT kontinua mantein  posizaun divorsiu ho Partido Demokratiku (PD) iha Bloku Koligasaun maske PD rasik tenta Presidente Partido CNRT, Kayrala Xanana Gusmao atu halo dialogu.

Maske senti todan simu realidade nee maibe PD nudar partido politiku ida labele minimiza an, haraik an ba kargu ka posizaun iha governu hodi halai tu’tuir partido seluk husu kargu no servisu.

Deklarasaun CNRT nian nee halo PD fuan  moras, maibe nee mak realidade politika, hamutuk iha bloku la harmonia ona diak liu fahe malu. Duke hamutuk iha uma kain ida maibe la rona malu, ida idak lao tuir ida ida ninia hakarak.

Agora dilema mos ba PD, sekarik sai duni husi governu, prontu sai opozisaun ka kontinua apoia governu maske sai ona husi Bloku Koligasaun. PD karik senti, sai husi governu no halo opozisaun iha parlamentu nee dik, maibe opozisaun nee kontra governu Xanana, CNRT mesmo Rui Araujo husi Fretilin.

“Hanesan membru hau rezeita dialogu ho PD, hau halo dialogu ho PD atu koalia saida, pesoalmente sira nia preokupasaun hakarak ba koalia ho Presidente laos ho ami,” Cesar Valente.

Pozisaun sira hanesa nee hatudu katak CNRT lakohi duni ona lao hamutuk ho PD iha governu, nebe membru governu PD nian tenki hatudu berani hodi deside entrega kargu sira nee ba CNRT.

Membru PD nebe asumi kargu politiku nudar Ministru, Vice Ministru no Sekretario Estadu tenki berani entrega kargu ministru, vice minsitru no sekretario estadu nee ba CNRT atu labe iha presedente ida katak PD ambisaun ba ukun.

PD partyido mais joven, PD partido jerasaun foun labele hanesan fali eis Presidente Republika Indonesia, Gusdur nebe lakohi husik kargu hodi nunee kous sai husi palacio Presdente laran.

Nudar partido politiku ida tenki toma pozisaun nebe forte, labele mamar, CNRT lakohi ona atu lao hamutuk entrega kargu sira nee ba fali CNRT hodi nomeia ba fali membru governu foun.

Problema nee klaru hamosu pro no kontra iha PD laran, li’liu sira nebe iha ezekutivu tamba hakarak ka lakohi divorsiu nee impaktu ba sira tenki husik kargu hodi entrega ba CNRT.

Agora membru governu husi PD nian mos dilema atu deside se fo atu hili, hakarak kontinua sai ministru diak liu sai independente nebe too mandatu hotu afilia kedas ba CNRT, se hakarak metin nafatin ho PD diak liu sai, kargu fo fali ba CNRT atu deside.

Konaba preokupasaun publiku nian katak bloku koligasaun nakfera governu monu, lae, dadaun bloku koligasaun nee laos ona PD maibe politikamente CNRT ho FRETILIN iha koligasaun ida tamba Primeiru Ministru husi Fretilin, membru governu nee barak mai husi Fretilin, sa tan governu aloka osan ba ZEESM nebe Sekejen Fretilin, Mari Alkatiri mak lidera.

Neebe FRETILIN mos garante ona katak bloku koligasaun nakfera, Fretilin fo apoiu ba governu, li’liu Orsamentu Jeral Estadu aprova atu nunee governu labele monu no lebele iha eleisaun antisipada.*

SIMU DESIZAUN CNRT, PD HUSU DIALOGU HO XANANA


Partidu Demokratiku (PD) iha resposta karta partidu CNRT hateten katak sira simu desizaun CNRT nian maibe husu atu halo dialogu ho  Prezidente Partidu Congresu Nasional Rekonstrusaun Timor-Leste (CNRT), Kay Rala Xanana Gusmão.

Iha Segunda (21/3/2016), PD responde ona karta ne’ebe mak CNRT haruka hodi hasai PD husi Bloku Koligasaun (BK).

Prezidente PD, Adriano do Nascimento, dehan, los duni nia simu karta husi CNRT, nune’e mos nia responde ona karta ‘’divorsiu’’ ne’e.

“Ami responde tiha ona karta husi CNRT nian, karta entrega iha CNRT nia kantor, maibe ninia kontiudu depois mak fo sai, sante-sante deit sa, lalika ansi,” dehan Adriano ba Jornalista sira iha uma fukun Parlamentu Nasional (PN), Tersa (22/03/2016).

 “Depois mak imi (red-Jornalista) rona ba, tanba buat ida politik ukun ne’e buat hot-hotu lori ba media, media ne’e la’os fatin, kuandu buat hotu lori ba media ne’e ita la buka dalan diak ida ba nasaun. PD nia prinsipiu mak atu laiha koligasaun ka iha koligasaun inportante nasaun ida ne’e hakmatek iha estabilidade, dezenvolvimentu la’o nafatin,” dehan Adriano.

Maske nune’e PD husu ba Prezidente CNRT Kay Rala Xanana Gusmão atu halo dialogu ho konselhu lideransa sentral PD nian hodi koalia ba malu kona ba asuntu koligasaun em relasaun ho estabilidade Governativa.

Nia dehan, PD hanesan partidu Joven nian ne’ebe sira hanoin ba dok, la’os hanoin ba aban ka bainrua nian, tanba ne’e maka nia husu atu kalma loron ida sei hetan resposta kompletu ho rajaun fundamental ba karta ne’e.

“Ami nia prinsipiu maka diak liu tur hamutuk hodi rezolve, labele lori malu ba iha media no estrada. Ami seidauk hasoru maun Xanana, maibe la’os hasoru atu koalia deit ba karta ne’ebe sira haruka mai ami, mais ami koalia mos konaba asuntu ezonerasaun ba xefi Estado Maior das F-FDTL nian, antes ne’e ami hasoru tiha ona ita nia bispu nain rua, Primeiru Ministru, Rui Maria de Araujo, no Prezidente Republika, momentu ne’eba ami mos atu hasoru malu ho maun Lu Olo no Mari, mais primeiru ministru dehan mai ami katak sira nain rua ba tiha ona singapura, no maun Xanana mak seidauk hasoru to’o agora, mais ami iha planu ona,” dehan Prezidente PD ne’e ho oin hamnasa.

Maske Adriano do Nascimento rejeita hodi lakohi fo sai karta nia konteudu ne’e, maibe tuir fonte balun fo sai katak konteudu karta resposta ba CNRT ne’e hateten katak, PD simu desizaun partidu CNRT nian.

Iha fatin hanesan, Deputado bankada CNRT, Arão Noe, katak, nia rasik mos seidauk hatene karta resposta husi Partidu Demokratiku nian.

“Ami rona informasaun katak karta tama ona, mais kona ba nia kontiudu ami seidauk hatene, tanba iha nivel CPN partidu nian, depois mak sira fo hatene mai ami. Mais tuir informasaun ne’ebe mak iha katak PD hakarak halo Dialogu, mais ne’e responsabilidade partidu nian,” dehan Arão.

Atu deside dialogu desizaun mai husi nivel altu partidu nian, tan ne’e maka  kuandu dialogu maka sei fo opsaun rua katak mantein ka sai.

“Kuandu dialogu bele iha dalan rua, se ita konsensus ida ho objetivo defende programa Governu nian no fo  apoiu total ba Governu , ida labele sai fali opozisaun ba programa Governu nian ne’ebe ita hot-hotu iha laran se ita ho objetivo ida ne’e hau hanoin partidu sei deside, mais iha oin mak halo tuir iha kotuk komentario soke ba soke mai entaun iha la loyal, ne’ebe PD tenke hakru’uk total ba programa Governu nian no tau interese nasional iha leten, labele hatama interese partidu nian,” dehan nia. mia

Jornal Nacional

EKIPA OPERASAUN BA GAM KONTINUA LA’O


Ekipa  konjuntu  operasaun  Falintil  Forsa  Defesa  Timor  Leste  (F-FDTL) ho  Polisia  Nasional  Timor  Leste  (PNTL)  oras  ne’e  kontinua  hala’o  operasaun  iha  tempu  kalan ba  grupu  hirak  ne’ebe  mak  hakarak  kria  instabilidade  iha  rai  laran.

“Ami  nia  ekipa  operasaun  oras  ne’e   kontinua  hala’o  operasaun  iha  tempu  kalan  hodi  buka    ema  sira  ne’ebe  mak  hakarak  provoka  situasaun  no  kria  instabilidade  liu-liu  grupu  Arte  Marsiais,” dehan Komandante  Jeral  Polisia  Nasional  Timor  Leste  (PNTL)  komisariu  Julio  da  Costa  Hornay ba  Jornalista  sira  iha  nia  servisu  fatin  Kuartel  Jeral  PNTL  Caicoli,  Tersa  (22/3).

Nia hatutan, problema  ne’ebe  mak  mosu  iha  tempu  kalan  ne’e  laos  ba  grupu  arte  marsiais hotu, maibe  balun  de’it.

Tantu konflitu ne’ebe  mosu  iha  tempu  kalan  ne’e  inkluindu  problema  violensia  domestika, entre  fen  ho  laen  ne’ebe  mosu  iha  uma  laran, no  hakarak  lori  prblema  ne’e  sai  bo’ot  liu  liu  ba  feto  sira  ne’ebe  mak  gosta  keixa  tun  sa’e  no  bele  soran  nia  laen  ba  ho  nia  familia  sira  nune’e  balun  hein  sai  husi  nia  uma  mak  bele  mosu  problema  iha  estrada.Tos

Jornal Nacional

MANIFESTASAUN DARUAK, LA’O KONTROLADU


Manifestasaun durante loron rua (22-23) hetan  seguransa  masimu  husi  Polisia  Nasional  Timor  Leste (PNTL)  ne’ebe  kompostu  husi  Unidade  Espesial  Polisia  (UEP) ho  Polisia  Taks  Force.

Espresaun  ne’ebe  mak  hato’o  husi  povu  Timor  Leste  liu  husi  asaun  pasifiku  konaba  fronteira  maritima  Australia  ba  loron  rua  ne’e  polisia  ho  seguransa  nasional  sira  mos  akumula  fatin  ba  manifestantes  sira  hodi  la’o  tuir, nune’e  seguransa  hirak  ne’ebe  la’o  iha  fatin  manifestasaun  ne’e  la’o  kontroladu.

Dalan  ne’ebe  mak  taka  hodi  utiliza  para  no  kareta  sira  mak  suku  Kampo  Alor  ho  nune’e  Polisia  sira  fasil  atu  atu  kontrola, tamba  numeru  manifestante  barak  liu.

Iha  fatin  manifestasaun  embaixada  Australia  nia  oin  Unidade  Espesial  Polisia  sira  mos  hodi  kareta  Polisia  Nasional  Timor  Leste   ninia  ba  taka  dalan  atu  nune’e  asegura  seguransa  ba  embaixada  Australia, antes  balun  hanoin  brutalidade.

Polisia  Nasional  Timor  Leste  hahú  akompanha  no  hala’o  seguransa  iha  fatin  manifestasaun  husi tuku  6:00  otl to’o remata.Tos

Jornal Nacional

HAK: Atendementu DP Ba Arguido Prizaun Preventiva Seidauk Diak


Diretor Assosiasaun Direitus Humanus (HAK), Manuel Monteiro, hateten atendementu judisial Defensor Publiku (DP) ba arguido sira ho prizaun preventiva durante ne’e ladun diak.

Wainhira HAK halo monitorizaun iha prizaun rua (Becora no Gleno), nia dehan, prizioneiru sira sempre kestiona kona ba sistema atendementu defensores publiku ne’ebe ladun vizita no tau matan ba arguido sira.

“Sira akompanha iha primeiru julgamentu deit, sira la esforsu tan atu buka tan evidensia katak hau nia kliente ne’e sala duni ga la’e, sira la halo tan ida ne’e ona,” Diretor HAK Monteiro kestiona, iha Dili.

Pior liu tan, nia hateten, defensor publiku sira ne’e kuandu atende lider sira ne’ebe komete krimi, ne’e diak liu duke povu kbi’it la’ek sira.

“Deferensias bo’ot tebes ho lideres ou osan nain sira, ne’e sira nia akompanhamentu diak tebes, sira buka tan evidensia depois sira halo rekursu, maibe ba povu ki’ik sira laiha,” nia kompara.

Hatan ba kestaun ne’e Prezidente Defensor Publiku, Sergio Hornai, rekonese katak servisu DP durante ne’e seiduak maximu, tanba rekursu humanus sei limitadu hodi atende ba arguido ho desizaun prizaun preventive.

“Defensor publiku iha deit nain tolu nulu no ita iha prizioneirus por volta de 500 ital, entaun ita labele proporsionaliza ita nia rekursu ho numeru prizioneirus ne’ebe mak iha,” Hornai hateten.

Maske nune’e, nia dehan, defensores publiku nafatin esforsu oinsa mak fo asistensia ne’ebe diak, espesialmente ba sira ne’ebe mak foin hasoru primeiru interogatoriu, no hasoru sumariu e julgamentu sira ne’ebe mak markadu ona.

“Ita presiza halo jestaun tempu, mesmu sira labele atende hotu kedas, maibe minimu sei bele halo buat ida ba ema ida rua ho numeru rekursus ne’ebe mak ita iha,” nia hateten.

The Dili Weekly

HANDS OF TIMOR'S OIL



How Australia Overplayed Its Hand in the Timor Sea

View From LL2 - Posted on March 10, 2014

In 1976, the Australian ambassador to Indonesia wrote that, in deciding whether to support the right of the Timorese people to self-determination or to instead accede to Indonesia’s annexation, Australia faced a choice between “Wilsonian idealism” and “Kissengerian realism.” For reasons having a lot to do with petroleum, Australia decided to go with what it saw as the latter option.

Today, the Timor Sea dispute remains unresolved, and it is clear that Australia still has not decided to go with the “Wilsonian idealism” option. But if Australia thinks that its strategy has instead been one of “Kissengerian realism,” then it is sadly flattering itself. Australia’s strategy isn’t “realist” – it’s petty bullying motivated by a very narrow political economy concern.

The short-term results for Australia have been somewhat favorable, if mixed, but there is reason to doubt that this strategy will ultimately be in Australia’s long-term interests. Thus far, Australia has now spent over forty years pursuing a sovereignty claim that was long ago discarded by international law, and, so far, its reach has continually exceeded its grasp.

I. Australia Overplays its Hand with Indonesia

In the early 1970s, Australia was fighting a losing battle under international law. The law of the sea had begun to coalesce around the concept of the Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ), which would grant states a right to exploit the natural resources that were within 200 nautical miles of its shores. Australia — which happens to enjoy extremely long, sloping continental shelves off of its coasts — was attempting to also obtain recognition for its claim to the resources within the “natural prolongation” of its continental shelf, even where this prolongation extended beyond its 200 mile EEZ.

But the rest of the world wasn’t buying it. Australia did its best to advocate for its continental shelf claims, but itwas well aware that international law was trending against it.

In 1971 and 1972 however, Australia was able to enter into seabed boundary treaties with Indonesia that largely reflected Australia’s “natural prolongation” position. By general consensus, Australia succeeding in taking “Indonesia to the cleaners” in reaching these agreements, as the resulting treaties were drawn much closer to Indonesia’s shores than to Australia’s, and adhered to a dying position under international law. Indonesia’s acceptance of these borders can be explained by political factors, more so than legal ones, as it was clear even in 1972 that the natural prolongation principle was becoming rapidly becoming disfavored under international law.

The treaties with Indonesia did not establish the maritime boundary between Australia and Portuguese Timor, however, which resulted in the infamous “Timor gap.” Portugal insisted that any maritime boundary between Timor and Australia be drawn along a more equitable division, on a median line that was equidistant between the shores, as provided by not-yet customary international law. The dispute became even more acute in 1974, Portuguese Timor leased out mining rights in the Timor Sea to a U.S. corporation, for a portion of the seabed expanse lying on Timor’s side of the equidistant line. Australia protested, as it had already leased out that territory itself, to what was then Woodside-Burmah Oil. Although Australia knew its claims to the seabed were disputed, Australia had made assurances to Woodside-Burmah, and to other corporations with leases in the Timor Sea, that the Australian government would defend its claims to that territory should there ever be any international conflict as to Australia’s title. 

So Australia made the deliberate choice not to enter into any conclusive agreements with Portugal concerning its maritime boundaries with what is now Timor-Leste. Rather than accept an equitable seabed division, Australia gambled on a chance to acquire a much more extensive portion of the Timor Sea, by standing by and awaiting a more amenable government to come into power in Timor-Leste.

Describing what Australia did as “standing by” is something of an understatement, in truth. Australia’s involvement in the annexation was not entirely passive acceptance. In the months prior to the invasion, Indonesia had not made East Timor a priority, and, if anything, Indonesia indicated a great deal of ambivalence towards its role in the island’s future. Afterwards, once the invasion had taken place, Indonesia repeatedly expressed its belief that Australia “green lighted” the takeover of Timor —  a claim which Australia would describe as simply a unfortunate misunderstanding on Indonesia’s part. It’s not difficult to see where Indonesia got the impression from. There was an undeniable “nudge nudge, wink wink” quality to the Australian Prime Minister’s pre-invasion statements to Indonesia, such as his announcement that “an independent Timor would be an unviable state and a potential threat to the area.” (Two years later, the Indonesian Foreign Minister would deny that Australia told Indonesia to go ahead with the invasion – instead, Australia merely told Indonesia that it accepted the invasion was inevitable, so Indonesia “should do it as quickly as possible.”)

Australia had imagined that, once Indonesia was in control, Australia would be able to easily secure a boundary agreement that drew a straight boundary line across the East Timor maritime area, between the very favorable Indonesian-Australian maritime boundaries to the east and west of East Timor:


But in the end, the Indonesian annexation of East Timor did not work out as Australia had anticipated. As it turned out,  although Indonesia had previously so accommodating with its seabed boundaries, by 1977 it was no longer quite so keen on accepting maritime treaties that disproportionately favored Australia’s interests over its own. Indonesia resisted Australia’s attempts to secure an inequitable seabed delimitation, and it was not until 1991, a full fifteen years after Indonesia’s invasion of East Timor, that the Timor Gap Treaty came into effect between Indonesia and Australia.

And then, a mere eight years later, Timor-Leste gained independence after all, and all of Australia’s hard work in securing the Timor Gap Treaty was wiped away. The treaty was so blatantly indefensible that Timor-Leste had little difficulty in convincing the world that Timor-Leste, as the successor state, would not be bound by its terms.

II. Australia Overplays Its Hand with Timor-Leste

After Timor-Leste came into existence, Australia was forced to renegotiate the division of the Timor Sea, in order to secure its access to the seabed resources on Timor-Leste’s side of the median line. Going into treaty negotiations, Australia had every advantage over Timor-Leste in terms of size, power, infrastructure, capital, and statecraft experience, but Timor-Leste had at least one thing in its favor. While Timor-Leste was weaker than Australia on every other conceivable measure, Timor-Leste had the stronger claim under international law.

Australia responded the same way every powerful nation does, when it finds itself on the wrong side of international law in a dispute with a weaker nation: it did everything it could to remove international law from the equation. After years of negotiations – during which Australia’s negotiation strategies included economic blackmail and espionage, and likely bribery as well – Australia eventually succeeded in inducing Timor-Leste to enter into to a series of treaties that eliminated any possible recourse to international law to resolve the parties’ conflicting territorial claims. (*1)

And this strategy made sense. States are encouraged to negotiate with one another to resolve disputes regarding the delimitation of their respective EEZs or continental shelves, and there’s nothing wrong with Australia’s hardline position in negotiating over the Timor Sea’s petroleum. (Well, nothing wrong with it aside from the whole espionage part, anyway.) UNCLOS provides that the agreements over the division of the seabed boundaries should be reached “on the basis of international law,” but that doesn’t mean that any resulting treaty has to divide the territory in the manner that international law would dictate. States are free to reach treaty terms that, while based on international law, deviate extensively from how the ICJ might have accomplished the territorial division, had the task been given to the ICJ instead.

But in the case of the Timor Sea Treaty, and the International Unitisation Agreement for Greater Sunrise, and the Certain Maritime Arrangements in the Timor Sea Treaty, it looks as if Australia may have grossly overplayed its hand. These treaties were not simply the result of Australia driving a hard bargain over a disputed point of international law – they were the result of a decades-long strategy of coercive bargaining aimed at securing sovereignty over territory to which it had no defensible legal claim.

And the end result? Australia’s great prize has been an expensive, unproductive, and uncertain stalemate. It has been fifteen years since Australia first began to negotiate with Timor-Leste’s emergent government over the division of the Timor Sea, and the Greater Sunrise gas fields are no closer to completion today than they were on the day that Timor-Leste voted for independence. The corporations that hold mining rights in the disputed seabed territories do not have any more legal certainty today than they had forty years ago, before Indonesia’s annexation of East Timor.

Australia is also now facing proceedings in both the International Court of Justice and the Permanent Court of Arbitration, as a result of its dubious activities in pursuing these strategies. There is also a non-zero risk that Australia’s treaties with Timor-Leste will ultimately be annulled for its bad faith negotiations, and Timor-Leste may eventually even succeed in kicking out the existing consortiums and attracting investment from other corners of the world.

But even if Australia ultimately succeeds in keeping control of the seabed territory and manages to siphon off its percentage of the petroleum revenues, it will have come at the cost of decades of uncertainty and wasted expense. If Australia wins now, will its Timor Sea strategy still have provided a net financial benefit to Australia, as compared with what Australia might have obtained under a less extreme strategy? Possibly – only Australia has the numbers to evaluate that. But if nothing else, its profit margin is getting smaller with every year that passes.

III. The Long-Term Interests Served by Australia’s Timor Sea Policy

The Timor Sea maritime delimitation remains unresolved today because Australia has insisted, at every opportunity, that any division of the Timor Sea must be based too much on the relative strength of its political and economic power, and too little on the relative weakness of its legal position.

But the potential benefits to Australia in taking this position just aren’t grand enough to justify the headache it has caused. This was never a situation where Australia risked walking away empty-handed, and any deal that Australia struck with Timor-Leste was always going to wind up with Australia getting a bigger piece of the pie than it was strictly entitled to under international law. But, by attempting to achieve a treaty arrangement that so disproportionately favors Australia over Timor-Leste, and which goes so far beyond what might have been expected based on the parties’ initial bargaining positions, Australia ensured that any victory it did obtain would necessarily be inconclusive.

International law obviously presents a big disadvantage to Australia in its claims to the seabed on Timor-Leste’s side of the median line. But Australia has given insufficient credit to the benefits that come with complying with an international legal regime. Even when international law does not favor a state’s interests in a particular dispute, it still provides one very significant advantage to all parties: the stability and relative legal certainty that comes from an agreement backed by international law. Legal resolutions have their weaknesses, true, but they are much less subject to future challenges on the basis of changes in political or economic circumstances. This is in direct contrast to agreements and concessions that are based on comparative force and economic machinations, which are not likely to outlive any changes to the underlying conditions that gave rise to those agreements or concessions in the first place. Australia’s policy in Timor has always been based on the political conditions du jour, and so, despite its far stronger political position, Australia has never been able to enjoy any certainty in its position in the Timor Sea.

In 1974, if instead Australia had accepted Portugal’s offer to establish a seabed boundary along the median line, then there is every reason to believe that the dispute could well have been conclusively resolved then and there, never to be revisited again. But that didn’t happen. Australia decided to take its chances with Indonesia instead, and Australia lost that gamble.

And then in 1999, if Australia had realized that claiming the lion’s share of the petroleum in the Timor Sea was no longer a viable strategy, and had, for example, been more willing to give up tax revenues in exchange for control of the commercial infrastructure, then it is likely we’d already have production from Greater Sunrise. But instead of trying something different when Timor-Leste gained independence, Australia decided to try the exact same strategy once again, and once again, it’s not working. Sure, this time around Australia did give a slightly larger cut of the profits to Timor-Leste than it had been willing to give to Indonesia, but that’s hardly a concession when the legal field has completely turned against you in the intervening period.

Hindsight suggests that Australia’s better course might have been to secure a treaty that, while still disproportionately favorable to Australia, was not quite as grossly disproportionate as the ones it ultimately obtained. If Australia had taken a more moderate path, and if the Timor Sea Treaty had been slightly more equitable the first time around, then perhaps it would have become a settled part of the legal landscape, avoiding any need to later negotiate the IUA or CMATS, or to engage in the present Hague arbitration and ICJ case brought by Timor-Leste.

But as it stands, the resulting treaties are so peculiarly at odds with customary international law that Timor-Leste doesn’t have much to lose by continuing its collateral attacks to the treaties’ validity. And whether or not Timor-Leste ultimately succeeds, Australia can’t wind the clock back – Australia has already caused the Greater Sunrise fields to remain untapped for 40 years since their discovery.

This is not to say that Australia’s Timor Sea strategy has been wholly self-defeating. There have been some significant advantages that Australia has been able to secure for itself, and which it would have lost had it acquiesced to international law at an earlier date. One major upshot for Australia has been the chance to deplete the Laminaria-Corallina gas fields while the legal dispute was unsettled, allowing Australia to retain 100% of the bureaucratic control and tax revenues, while Timor-Leste got 0%. Australia also succeeded in maintaining the lion’s share of the bureaucratic control over Bayu-Undan, along with the rest of the petroleum in the JPDA. And, as a bonus, Australia even gets to keep 10% of the profits from the JPDA, too — when international law would have given it 0%.

But Laminaria-Corallina was always a sideshow in terms of total energy resources in the Timor Sea, and, while the JPDA arrangement is exceedingly favorable to Australia, in comparison to its actual legal position, Australia still viewed even that as a concession to Timor-Leste. But this deal was only a ‘concession’ if viewed in reference to the prior sovereignty claims that Australia championed (but international law ultimately rejected) in 1975, and which are no longer supportable under international law.

Perhaps the most important prize for Australia, however, has been preserving Australian corporations’ favored status as leaseholders for mining rights in the Timor Sea. If Portugal’s median delimitation had prevailed in 1974, then the Bayu-Undan gas fields (and all the rest of the resources in the JPDA) would have gone to Oceanic, and other corporations that were granted leases to those mining rights while Timor was still under Portuguese control. Through Indonesia’s annexation of East Timor in 1975, however, all the leases issued by Portugal were effectively annulled. Since then, those same core consortium of companies have been able to maintain their rights to the seabed that Australia originally granted in the 1960s and 1970s. Australia’s treaties with Timor-Leste have all contained special provisions ensuring the continuity of Woodside’s and ConocoPhillips’ existing leases, and, before that, Australia’s treaties during the time of Indonesian Timor all came with sweetheart deals for corporations that held pre-1975 mining rights

So Australia has gained some important outcomes through its Timor Sea strategy. But, has all of that been worth the costs?

Billions of dollars in petroleum is a lot of petroleum, and the oil and gas fields in the Timor Sea are a significant prize. But Timor-Leste is still only one very small country, and the Timor Sea is only one very small sea. (And besides – if it is truly is the tax revenues that Australia is most concerned about losing, then surely it could try and make some of that up by shaving off some of the tax concessions that it has granted to the petroleum consortiums?)

No matter what Australia wins in the Timor Sea, Australia has another foreign policy concern that is much bigger than Timor-Leste could ever be: China.

Because China, too, has made expansive claims to maritime territories, despite the lack of a plausible basis for these claims under international law. And China, like Australia, is also able to assert these territorial claims due to its vastly greater strength and power, relative to its maritime neighbors. And China, like Australia, has pursued a strategy of eliminating any opportunity for its territorial claims to be challenged before an international tribunal.

But Australia’s claims in the Timor Sea are chump change, compared to China’s claims in the Nine-Dashed Line. That is a true example of a realist strategy; Australia’s pandering to energy companies doesn’t hold a candle to China, when it comes to “Kissengerian realism.”

And while Australia’s dispute with Timor-Leste carries no risk of escalation, China’s claims in the South and East China Seas pose a serious security threat to everyone in the Pacific. Whatever financial benefit Australia ends up obtaining from its claims in Timor-Leste’s half of the Timor Sea, would it be enough to offset the cost of any disruption, should China decides to back its own maritime claims up with force?

Australia, by itself, can’t stop China’s expansionism, of course. But by maintaining its current policy toward Timor-Leste, Australia has forfeited its ability advocate for the legal resolution of China’s unlawful territorial claims. And, more generally, Australia also undermines whatever institutional force that international law might have to help peacefully resolve disputes over maritime territories.

Given those potential costs, is Australia correct in believing its Timor Sea strategy to be a shrewdly realist foreign policy, which serves Australia’s long-term national interests by providing a possible opportunity to increase its annual tax revenue by .3%? (*2) Or is it a short-sighted economic policy that provides a minimal financial benefit at the cost of harming Australia’s broader foreign policy interests?

-Susan

FN1: Australia has done it’s best to prevent Timor-Leste from having any recourse to international law. The Certain Maritime Arrangements in the Timor Sea (CMATS) agreement, which Timor-Leste is currently seeking to invalidate through arbitration proceeding that it initiated last year, explicitly forbids Timor-Leste from so much as asserting that Australia’s claims to the Timor Sea or legally invalid:

1. Neither Australia nor Timor-Leste shall assert, pursue or further by any means in relation to the other Party its claims to sovereign rights and jurisdiction and maritime boundaries for the period of this Treaty.

CMATS also cleverly specifies that even though neither party can make claims to the right to conduct activities in those areas, either party can continue any previous activities in those territories, as well as authorize new activities in those territories, just so long as it had pre-existing laws allowing those activities:

2. Paragraph 1 of this Article does not prevent a Party from continuing activities (including the regulation and authorisation of existing and new activities) in areas in which its domestic legislation on 19 May 2002 authorised the granting of permission for conducting activities in relation to petroleum or other resources of the seabed and subsoil. [see side letters]

As it turns out, Australia had comprehensive laws concerning the exploitation of resources in the Timor Sea as of the relevant cut-off date, but Timor-Leste did not have any similar legislation in place. This is a result of the unfortunate fact that Timor-Leste did not actually exist until  May 20, 2002, and therefore did not have any legislation as of the May 19, 2002 deadline that the treaty provides for.

That’s pretty convenient for Australia. It now has the right to utilize all the disputed areas as if it did in fact have lawful authority to do so.

5. Any court, tribunal or other dispute settlement body hearing proceedings involving the Parties shall not consider, make comment on, nor make findings that would raise or result in, either directly or indirectly, issues or findings of relevance to maritime boundaries or delimitation in the Timor Sea. Any such comment or finding shall be of no effect, and shall not be relied upon, or cited, by the Parties at any time.

The last sentence, in bold, is also singled out for extra importance by Article 12 of CMATS, concerning the treaty’s duration. There, it is provided that the second sentence of paragraph 5 of Article 4, in bold above, “shall survive termination of this Treaty, and the Parties shall continue to be bound by [it] after termination[.]” In other words, if any judicial body — whether it is the International Court of Justice, the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea, or any other court or arbitration panel — were to ever issue a ruling finding Australia’s claims to the Timor Sea unlawful, and that Timor-Leste has sovereignty over those waters, then Timor-Leste is prohibited from relying on that ruling.

As a result of these provisions, Timor-Leste is not currently raising a direct challenge to CMATS itself, but is actually using an arbitration provision in the prior Timor Sea Treaty to obtain to seek a declaration that CMATS is invalid.

FN2: Note that this a very rough estimate, as exact figures are hard to come by, but it almost certainly exaggerates the total value to Australia. The .3% figure is based on a back-of-the-envelope calculation that assumes lifetime total tax revenues of $2.5b from Laminaria-Corallina, $26b from Greater Sunrise, and $16b from Bayu-Undan, and assumes a 40-year span (based on a scenario where Sunrise taps out in ~2039), and is then based on AU’s total tax revenue for last year of $370b. This figure also assumes that Australia receives all of the revenue from all of the disputed portion of the Timor Sea, as opposed to the $17b share it would actually receive under the current divisions of the TST (10% of Bayu-Undan, 100% of Laminaria-Corallina) and CMATS (50% of Greater Sunris

Picture (map): The blue line shows the Indo-Australian maritime boundary, as established in the parties’ 1971 and 1972 treaties. The green line shows the median boundary line between Australia and the island of Timor.

DEPOIS DA OCUPAÇÃO INDONÉSIA É A AUSTRÁLIA QUE OCUPA E ROUBA TIMOR-LESTE


Já vem da há tempos atrás a luta de Timor-Leste para sentar à mesa de negociações a Austrália com a abordagem à ocupação ilegal, segundo as leis internacionais, do Mar de Timor. Reconhecidamente a Austrália ocupa parte do Mar de Timor ilegalmente com o intuito de se apoderar de substancial espaço dos campos petrolíferos de Timor-Leste, campos com jazidas de petróleo e gás que está ilegalmente a explorar. Em linguagem normal e popular chama-se a isto um roubo.

No último ano Timor-Leste vem pressionando com maior acuidade a Austrália para que reconheça o facto e negoceie com Timor-Leste o limite da fronteira marítima de acordo com as leis internacionais. É evidente que a Austrália terá de recuar muitas milhas. É evidente que a Austrália não terá mais a possibilidade de roubar o petróleo e o gás de Timor-Leste. Por esse motivo a Austrália procura ganhar tempo, procura explorar ilegalmente as jazidas de petróleo e gás que não lhe pertencem. Nessa perpetiva de ganhar tempo nega a sentar-se à mesa das negociações, mais tarde sentar-se-à e voltará a procurar ganhar tempo. A Austrália procurará esgotar o mais possível o tempo que considere necessário para também esgotar as jazidas que ocupa e explora ilegalmente e contra a vontade dos timorenses.

Foi ontem que a notícia da Lusa nos dava conhecimento de uma mega manifestação em Díli, capital de Timor-Leste. Num país com uma população ínfima reuniram-se muitos milhares de timorenses junto da embaixada australiana - Milhares protestam em Díli contra Austrália por causa de fronteiras marítimas - em protesto pela posição da Austrália em se recusar a sentar-se à mesa de negociações, reconhecer a ilegalidade que está a cometer e recuar na linha de fronteira que o Direito Internacional estabelece.

Inseridos na legítima luta contra a ocupação australiana do Mar de Timor pela Austrália, a organização de veteranos da luta de libertação timorense, a ACBN, participante na manifestação de protesto e no processo de luta pela libertação do Mar de Timor ilegitimamente ocupado emitiu uma carta aberta ao primeiro-ministro australiano já aqui publicada e que poderão ler no TA. Carta aberta que foi lida durante a mega manifestação junto à embaixada da Austrália em Díli e entregue ao embaixador, representante em Timor-Leste do governo australiano chefiado por Malcolm Bligh Turnbull, primeiro-ministro da Austrália.

Quer o destino dos timorenses que após 24 anos de ocupação indonésia ainda tenham de suportar a ocupação australiana do Mar de Timor com o intuito puro e duro de roubar o que de todo pertence aos timorenses. Já que a Austrália tem a posição que se conhece também compete à comunidade internacional fazer-se ouvir e apontar à Austrália o cumprimento do Direito Internacional, o recuo para a linha da sua fronteira marítima, e a indemnização devida aos timorenses pelo debulho de anos e anos de exploração indevida das jazidas supra citadas.

Página Global / MM

*Introdução em Página Global à citada Carta Aberta ali publicada. Texto adaptado para a publicação em Timor Agora.

Macau. Cooperação com Hong Kong traz vantagens mútuas, diz Chui


O Chefe do Executivo, Fernando Chui Sai On, esteve ontem reunido com Peter Lam Kin Ngoh, presidente do Conselho de Turismo da vizinha Região Administrativa Especial de Hong Kong, num encontro que serviu sobretudo para analisar as perspectivas de cooperação na área do turismo entre ambos os territórios.

Chui Sai On reiterou que o Executivo que lidera está empenhado em transformar Macau num “Centro Mundial de Turismo e Lazer” e defendeu que a afirmação da RAEM como destino turístico de excelência irá também favorecer Hong Kong, dando um contributo importante para que a antiga colónia britânica se afirme como um grande destino turístico a nível mundial.

O Chefe do Executivo lembrou ainda que o abrandamento da indústria do jogo confrontou Macau com a necessidade de reajustar a sua economia e explicou que para responder ao desafio, o Governo que lidera vai empenhar-se em variar os mercados turísticos, através da atracção de visitantes oriundos de novos mercados.

Peter Lam Kin Ngoh, que liderou uma delegação de agentes do sector da indústria turística da vizinha RAEHK mostrou-se, por sua vez, convicto de que a cooperação entre as duas regiões administrativas especiais poderá originar proveitos mútuos e manifestou-se entusiasmado com a possibilidade de que a conclusão da Ponte Hong Kong – Macau – Zhuhai possa contribuir para uma maior aproximação entre ambos os territórios, nomeadamente com o fomento de estratégias de promoção conjuntas.

Peter Lam deixou mesmo a sugestão de se avançar para a criação de pacotes turísticos conjuntos, tendo por base uma experiência similar dinamizada em associação com operadores turísticos de Taiwan.

Amnistia Internacional pede ao novo Governo da Birmânia para libertar presos políticos


Banguecoque, 24 mar (Lusa) -- A Amnistia Internacional pediu hoje ao novo Governo da Birmânia que liberte todos os presos políticos encarcerados no país e que ponha fim ao clima de repressão usado por executivos anteriores.

Na próxima quarta-feira, Htin Kyaw será empossado Presidente, o primeiro eleito de forma democrática no último meio século de história da Birmânia.

A Amnistia Internacional sublinha que esta é uma oportunidade histórica para se fazerem avanços em matéria de direitos humanos e romper com o quadro legal repressivo que durante décadas permitiu detenções arbitrárias, num relatório intitulado "Novas expressões coincidem com a velha repressão".

"A legislação da Birmânia lê-se como um manual de repressão. Nos últimos anos, as autoridades aumentaram o seu uso para silenciar os dissidentes", assinala Champa Patel, diretora para o Sudeste Asiático da Amnistia, num comunicado que acompanha o relatório.

A organização pede a libertação imediata e incondicional de todos os presos de consciência.

Segundos dados da Amnistia, atualmente há cerca de 100 prisioneiros políticos na Birmânia, incluindo jornalistas, estudantes, ativistas e defensores dos direitos humanos, entre outros.

A Liga Nacional para a Democracia, liderada pela Nobel da Paz Aung San Suu Kyi, venceu as eleições gerais em novembro do ano passado.

Suu Kyi, impedida constitucionalmente de ocupar a presidência, fará parte da equipa governamental, apesar de ainda não se saber que cargo irá ocupar.

"O novo Governo deve dar prioridade à reforma legal para assegurar que a manifestação não é um crime (...). O Governo da Liga Nacional para a Democracia tem uma oportunidade de ouro para fazer reais mudanças nos direitos humanos", afirmou Patel.

ISG // FV.

Filme "Ten Years" criticado na China desaparece das salas de Hong Kong


Hong Kong, China, 24 mar (Lusa) -- O filme "Ten Years", que apresenta uma visão distópica de Hong Kong em 2025 e considerado"absurdo" pela China, é candidato a "melhor filme" na antiga colónia britânica, mas desapareceu das salas de cinema da região.

O filme, lançado em dezembro, é descrito como uma sátira sociopolítica: na ficção passada em Hong Kong em 2025, uma mulher idosa imola-se pelo fogo em protesto, um taxista desespera com a erosão da língua local (cantonense) e crianças andam nas ruas vestidas com uniformes militares, a fazer lembrar a Revolução Cultural chinesa. "Ten years" concorre nos 35.º Hong Kong Film Awards (HKFA), que serão entregues a 03 de abril.

"O filme dá voz aos sentimentos que atormentam os residentes de Hong Kong", disse à AFP Ng Ka-leung, de 34 anos, um dos jovens realizadores de Hong Kong que assina uma das curtas que integram "Ten Years", "Egg Man", que mostra um vendedor de ovos sob ataque dos "guardas vermelhos" que procuram denunciar cidadãos.

"Eu queria usar o filme para responder a algumas questões que sempre quis ver respondidas, incluindo se Hong Kong tem alguma saída e como iria Hong Kong mudar", acrescentou.

O filme foi realizado com um orçamento de meio milhão de dólares de Hong Kong (cerca de 57.400 euros) e gerou seis milhões de dólares de Hong Kong (cerca de 693 mil euros) em receitas. Não obstante o sucesso nas bilheteiras em Hong Kong, o filme está a ter dificuldades na distribuição na antiga colónia britânica.

"Por que é que os cinemas não consideram o nosso filme, que foi rentável e que muitas pessoas querem ver?", questionou Ng Ka-leung.

Na China, o filme foi rotulado pelo jornal Global Times -- publicado em língua inglesa --, de "totalmente absurdo", "demasiado pessimista" e um "vírus para a mente".

"Sel-Immolator", a curta assinada por Kiwi Chow, apresenta uma cena comum no Tibete, em que ativistas recorrem à imolação pelo fogo para protestar contra o controlo de Pequim, mas da qual não há registo em Hong Kong.

"Eu não quero que a minha história se torne realidade", disse Chow, de 37 anos.

As liberdades de Hong Kong estão protegidas pelo princípio 'Um país, dois sistemas', que também se aplica em Macau e ao abrigo do qual a antiga colónia britânica passou para a China em 1997, mas os receios têm aumentado sobre a crescente influência de Pequim no território, desde a política à educação e imprensa, e sobre o futuro da região administrativa especial chinesa.

Nos últimos meses, foram conhecidas as detenções na China de cinco livreiros que publicavam em Hong Kong livros críticos de Pequim. E na noite de 8 de fevereiro, véspera da entrada do Ano Novo Lunar, a cidade foi palco dos piores confrontos entre jovens e a polícia desde a ocupação das ruas por manifestantes em 2014.

Críticos de cinema dizem que a população de Hong Kong quer ver estes assuntos diretamente abordados.

"Há vários filmes políticos em Hong Kong, mas eles usam metáforas e formas indiretas para contar a história", disse à AFP o crítico de cinema em Hong Kong Dominic Li.

"Em 'Ten Years', eles são bastante diretos e atacam a presente situação em Hong Kong", acrescentou.

O filme vai estar no Osaka Asian Film Festival, no Japão, e vai ser exibido em Taiwan.

Em Hong Kong vai poder ser visto em 30 exibições comunitárias a 01 de abril.

FV // MP