domingo, 7 de janeiro de 2018

The Geopolitics of the Beijing-Moscow Consensus


The integration of China’s Belt and Road and Russia’s Eurasian Economic Union will have major implications.

By Enrico Cau* | The Diplomat

In the late 1950s the deterioration of Sino-Russian relations paved the way for the historic meeting between U.S. President Richard Nixon and Mao Zedong in 1972. The offspring of that meeting was the Shanghai Communiqué, and the onset of the Sino-American détente on one side and that Soviet containment in the Asia-Pacific on the other, a divide that would define the relations between the two communist countries for decades to come.

It was only at the end of the Cold War that, despite remaining challenges like territorial disputes and illegal immigration in the Russian Far East, Sino-Russian relations began to thaw. The two countries left ideological divisions behind for a more pragmatic approach based on the pursuit of shared interests and countering common threats as the guiding leitmotif of their renewed cooperation. This process of rapprochement, despite the more pessimistic expectations, has steadily improved over time.

In 1992, President Boris Yeltsin visited China. In 1993 the two countries signed a military agreement, followed in 1996 by their first strategic cooperation agreement, and by a number of other agreements: the 2001 Treaty of Good Neighborliness, Friendship and Cooperation; the founding of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization; and the 2012 Strategic Partnership, further upgraded in 2014. Meanwhile, a close personal relationship has developed between Chinese President Xi Jinping and Russian President Vladimir Putin.

The closer ties marked by this expanding and complex network of agreements and personal relationships have come to fruition, in particular, in the areas of arms salesmilitary technology transfers, and energy deals. Important progress was made also in the area of military relations where, despite the need to keep a credible level of deterrence, China and Russia have shown an unprecedented level of mutual trust, as confirmed by China’s ambassador to Russia, Li Hu, and by the growing number of joint military exercises between the two countries.

But what really epitomizes the increasing trust the two countries have toward each other was the signing of an agreement for the integration of the Eurasian Economic Union (EEU), Putin’s pet project, and the China-led Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). If successful, the BRI-EEU in Central Asia will mark one more step toward the consolidation of Sino-Russian relations, with important implications for both Asia and the West.

The BRI and the EEU: Opposites Attract

When Xi announced the launch of the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) in 2013, both Russia and the West were caught off guard. In particular, a sanction-stricken Russia seemed to have good reason to worry that the BRI could further weaken its position in Central Asia, Russia’s backyard, negatively affecting the EEU. Various assessments pointed in the same pessimistic direction, especially in the light of the fact that the two initiatives appear to differ remarkably in terms of institutional setup and strategic goals. The two initiatives are indeed very different. The BRI is a global open trade-focused project, embodying the essence of the Chinese “going out” strategy and a herald of globalized trade and multipolarism with Chinese characteristics. The EEU instead is an “inward-looking” trade integration project devised to allow Russia to keep hold of its Central Asian neighbors, and contain the expansion of the EU or the United States in those regions. Despite the pessimistic outlook, the relationship between China and Russia has, nonetheless continued to thrive, and so have their plans to create an area of co-prosperity under Sino-Russian control in Central Asia.

Dynamics of Sino-Russian Cooperation

The nature of the Sino-Russian entente appears to rest on a high level of complementarity, reciprocity, shared interests, and common threats. In this relationship, China and its BRI play the role of the global enabler, with China advancing its model while also providing a much-needed lifeline for Russian economy and the EEU. The role of Russia, instead, is seemingly shaping to be that of a regional stability provider, to the mutual benefit of both countries.

For China, Russian support in Central Asia offers multiple advantages. First, Russian influence and knowledge of regional dynamics can translate into a substantial mitigation of risks and the removal of several obstacles for BRI projects, reducing costs and maximizing benefits. China would also enjoy direct access to Central Asia, providing a unique opportunity to develop new markets, manufacturing centers, and even new cities along the path of the Silk Road Economic Belt (SREB). Second, Russian acceptance of Chinese intervention in Central Asia will allow the Middle Kingdom to play a direct role in the securitization and regime formation of the region, especially with regards to counter-insurgency initiatives aimed at preventing Uyghur from establishing safe havens in the region. Finally, this model of relationship has the potential to lay the foundations for the establishment of a core geopolitical space under exclusive Sino-Russian control in Eurasia, beyond the reach of EU and American influence, in a region strategically positioned between the developing markets of South, East, and Southeast Asia and the wealthy European markets.

What’s in it for Russia? The sanctions imposed on Russia by the United States and the European Union as a consequence of its annexation of Crimea, and the ongoing actions against Ukraine, combined with a downturnof oil prices, have caused enormous damages to Russian trade and to its relations with Europe and the United States. The resulting downward spiral is pushing Russia down the path of a political-economic isolation. This has forced Russia to shift away from the West and find alternative markets in other regions of the world, to bypass the sanctions and find new outlets for the Russian economy.

For these reasons, Russia has started to look at the Asia-Pacific as a viable way to expand its markets and those of the EEU. In this perspective, integration with the BRI can offer the EEU a privileged trade channel to the markets of Asia-Pacific, providing Russia with a unique opportunity to boost its “going east” strategy. Helped by a relative decline of the United States, whose vacuum is being filled by growing Chinese influence in the region, Russia’s shift toward the Asia-Pacific has resulted in a row of successful deals. That includes the signing of several important trade agreements with the Philippines and Indonesia; an important free trade agreementbetween the EEU and Vietnam; as well as closer trade relations with South Korea, one of the countries that has refused to enforce sanctions against Russia, a decision that has provided a boost to South Korean-Russian trade relations.

The Russian expansion in the Asia-Pacific has occurred with the friendly support of China. This mutual interpenetration in the two countries’ areas of geopolitical influence, on a seemingly equal basis, seems to point at a relationship marked by symmetricity, complementarity, and reciprocity.

The Rise of the Beijing-Moscow Consensus

The creation of an abiding Sino-Russian entente in Central Asia could eventually place a huge swath of Eurasian landmass under the influence of the two countries. In such a scenario, the role of Russia in China’s grand strategy appears to be not that of a spear-carrier for Beijing — a role that a proud country like Russia, with its past as a Cold War superpower, would never accept — but rather that of a key partner with an equal role in a common grand strategy aiming at reshaping the world order. This relational model, although in a different form, bears a vague resemblance to the one adopted by imperial China with its tributary states, where a mild Chinese influence at the periphery can be compensated for by the strong influence of a reliable ally.

The two countries seem to share the common goal of shaping a two-dimensional Beijing-Moscow Consensus. China is tasked with expanding its model at a global level, while Russia consolidates its power in the Eurasian region, acting as a strong stabilizing regional force and enforcing increasingly converging policies in a geopolitical space that is crucial for both Russian and Chinese interests. The advantage of this model is that its complementarity can appease both Chinese global ambitions and Russian regional and global goals, allowing both countries to co-prosper and enjoy virtually unchallenged dominance over a huge stretch of Eurasian territory, with significant consequences for farther regions, such as South, East and Southeast Asia and Central and Eastern Europe; all regions where, we have seen, Western influence is fading.

Another peculiar feature of the Beijing-Moscow entente is the resilience offered by its “multi-modality.” Unlike the Soviet Union during the Cold War, the Sino-Russian system would be able to coexist side by side with the current Western-led international system, with a high degree of interdependence in a multipolar, globalized regime. It would also have the capacity, however, to remain functional as a self-contained ecosystem. This is because the system is designed to control a large, resource-rich swath of Eurasian and Asian land, where China and Russia could enforce their model, replicating the features of the current international order complete with its own institutions, markets, security infrastructure, currency, and payment mechanisms, bypassing the dollar-based system if necessary. This type of redundancy seems to be devised to grant the survivability and sustainability of the core Sino-Russian ecosystem, should the level of antagonism between China, Russia, and the United States escalate to the point where the West seeks to enforce an economic and political isolation of China as it already does with Russia today and as it did with the Soviet Union during the Cold War.

Such a setup has the potential to cripple Western influence in Central Asian countries where the activities of the BRI, the EEU and the EU currently overlap, with game-changing shifts in the regional dynamics and important consequences for the EU and the United States. The fallout of Sino-Russian dominance in Central Asia could be felt also in other regions. In South Asia, countries like Pakistan and Afghanistan could benefit from the geopolitical stability and credibility brought by a Sino-Russian entente and the trade continuity offered by BRI-EEU integration. In some Central and Eastern European countries, China’s growing economic outreach and the establishment of a solid Sino-Russian bloc in Central Asia could threaten EU cohesion and cause a geopolitical conundrum for the United States and NATO. In the Asia-Pacific, the Chinese influence-building strategy, driven by an artful combination of economic influence, public diplomacy, and occasional assertiveness, is contributing to hasten the decline of American influence. China is filling the vacuum left an American leadership that has failed to deliver on several important initiatives, including the lackluster outcome of the “Pivot to Asia,” the termination of the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP), as well as the lack of leadership the United States has displayed vis-à-vis the Chinese encroachment of a number of maritime features in the South China Sea, which China turned into militarized artificial islands virtually unchallenged.

Conclusion

Despite all odds, Sino-Russian relations have evolved into increasingly closer cooperation underpinning the existence of a complex multidimensional geopolitical project driven by mutual interests and common threats. The two countries seem to have learned from the past that divisions don’t play well in face of common threats, in particular when it comes to their major competitor, the United States.

While at present Russia and China enjoy a very different type of relationship vis-à-vis the United States, the recent statements made by President Donald Trump and the posture of the new American National Security Strategy, where both China and Russia were defined as revisionist countries, may be a harbinger that China and its vagaries have been given too much leeway. The Chinese model, with all its incongruences, may be becoming too different from the U.S.-led system for the two to coexist under the same roof. Should this be the case, it is logical to assume that the cooperative-competitive relationship that has characterized Sino-American relations since the Obama administration will come to an end.

The Chinese rapprochement with Russia seems to indicate that the country has become aware that the expansion of the Middle Kingdom and its peculiar model may at some point become a threat serious enough for the West to justify the return to a more conservative strategy of containment. While far-fetched in a time characterized by the primacy of trade and markets, globalization, and high interdependence over ideology and protectionism, this course of action may become a viable option should the West decide that China and Russia have become a serious threat to the survival of the current international order.

*Enrico Cau is a Ph.D. candidate at the Graduate Institute of International Affairs and Strategic Studies (GIIASS) of Tamkang University, a member of the Taiwan Strategy Research Association (TSRA) and a member of the Philippine International Studies Organization (PHISO).

Portugueses formados em mandarim aproveitam "era dourada" entre Portugal e China

Pequim, 07 jan (Lusa) - A primeira geração de tradutores e intérpretes portugueses de língua chinesa está a aproximar Portugal e China no futebol, literatura ou arte, à medida que as relações entre os dois países entram numa "era dourada".

Tiago Nabais ingressou na licenciatura de Tradução e Interpretação Português/Chinês - Chinês/Português do Instituto Politécnico de Leiria (IPL) em 2007, depois de uma carreira musical "falhada" e "uns biscates aqui e ali". Tinha 29 anos.

Volvida uma década, concretizou um feito raro em Portugal: traduziu diretamente a partir do chinês uma obra literária - "Crónica de um vendedor de sangue", editado pela Relógio d'Água e escrito por um dos mais aclamados escritores chineses da atualidade, Yu Hua.

Também formado pelo IPL, Luís Lino agarrou aos 25 anos uma oportunidade "caída do céu" e rumou à China para servir de intérprete do técnico português André Villas-Boas, que na época passada orientou os chineses do Shanghai SIPG.

"Nem queria acreditar", contou Lino à agência Lusa sobre o convite para integrar o 'staff' de Villas-Boas.

No final de um treino em que esteve sempre ao lado do antigo treinador do FC Porto, o jovem revela que ainda pensou em tirar o curso de jornalismo após terminar o secundário, mas acabou por optar pelo estudo de uma língua "muito rentável".

O mandarim é a língua mais falada do mundo e o único idioma oficial da República Popular da China, país com 1.375 milhões de habitantes - cerca de 18% da população mundial - e a segunda maior economia do planeta.

Em colaboração com o Instituto Politécnico de Macau, o IPL abriu em 2006 a licenciatura de Tradução e Interpretação.

O Instituto Confúcio, organismo patrocinado por Pequim para assegurar o ensino de chinês, garante ainda cursos livres de mandarim em quatro universidades portuguesas - Aveiro, Coimbra, Lisboa e Minho.

E, desde 2016, o ensino do chinês foi também introduzido em algumas escolas portuguesas ao nível do secundário e do terceiro ciclo, como alternativa de língua estrangeira.

A primeira instituição de ensino superior em Portugal a oferecer uma licenciatura dedicada à língua chinesa, no entanto, foi a Universidade do Minho, com o curso em Estudos Orientais - Estudos Chineses e Japoneses, aberto em 2004.

Na altura, a China não era ainda "moda" em Portugal e os "estereótipos" sobre o país entre os portugueses eram "bastante acentuados", lembra Samuel Gomes, que ingressou naquela licenciatura em 2009.

"Existia ainda uma espécie de complexo em aprender mandarim", afirma o jovem portuense, que em 2016 foi distinguido com o prémio "Melhor Performance Artística" no Chinese Bridge, o maior concurso do mundo para alunos de língua chinesa.

O país asiático tornou-se, entretanto, um dos principais investidores em Portugal, comprando participações em grandes empresas das áreas da energia, seguros, saúde e banca, enquanto centenas de particulares chineses compraram casa em Portugal à boleia dos vistos 'gold'.

Jorge Torres-Pereira, que terminou em dezembro passado uma missão de mais de quatro anos à frente da Embaixada portuguesa em Pequim, considera mesmo que as relações entre os dois países atravessam uma "era dourada".

As visitas bilaterais de alto nível registaram, nos últimos anos, uma frequência inédita, enquanto o número de turistas chineses que visitaram Portugal quase duplicou, para 183 mil, entre 2013 e 2016.

Samuel Gomes não tem dúvidas: "Hoje, todos os portugueses falam da China".

JOYP // PJA

Erupção de vulcão obriga à retirada de toda a população da ilha de Kadova na Papua Nova Guiné

Banguecoque, 07 jan (Lusa) -- A erupção de um vulcão na ilha de Kadova, na Papua Nova Guiné, obrigou à retirada de toda a população que foi assistida pelas autoridades do país, segundo os media locais.

O vulcão cobriu com cinzas e lava mais de metade do território da ilha de Kadova, mas não causou vítimas, refere a agência de notícias Efe, citando órgãos de comunicação social locais.

O despertar repentino do vulcão, que expulsa uma coluna de fumo com mais de 2.000 metros de altura, ocorreu ao meio-dia de sexta-feira e surpreendeu os 600 habitantes da ilha.

Desde então, "entre 50 e 60% da ilha está coberta de resíduos vulcânicos", disse o Observatório da Vulcanologia de Rabaul ao portal de notícias "Loop".

Os especialistas, que afirmam estar surpresos com a repentina atividade vulcânica, detetaram nas últimas 24 horas um aumento na violência das emissões.

"Devido à inclinação da ilha, são possíveis deslizamentos de terra que, juntamente com a natureza explosiva do magma, podem gerar um tsunami", advertem os vulcanologistas.

Até agora, não havia dados sobre a erupção do vulcão, embora tivesse sido registado alguma atividade térmica em 1976.

A ilha de Kadovar, na costa nordeste do país, está localizada a cerca de 24 quilómetros a norte do território principal da Papua Nova Guiné.

Foi descoberta pelo navegador espanhol Iñigo Órtiz de Retes, em 1545, quando regressava de uma viagem exploratória ao atual México.

A Papua Nova Guiné situa-se no Anel de Fogo do Pacífico, uma área de grande atividade sísmica e vulcânica que provoca cerca de 7.000 tremores de terra por ano, a maioria moderados.

HN // VM     

Oposição na Guiné Equatorial diz que continua confinada e cercada

Militantes da oposição na Guiné Equatorial denunciaram hoje que continuam confinados na sede do partido, nos arredores da capital, Malabo, e cercados pelas forças de segurança oficiais, noticiou a agência espanhola Efe.

O líder do partido Cidadãos para a Inovação (CI), Nsé Obiang Obono, disse à Efe, por telefone, que está iminente a detenção das cinco dezenas de militantes confinados no edifício, entre os quais uma menor de idade, e pediu a intervenção das Nações Unidas.

"É o nono dia de assédio. Esta manhã, alguns militantes do partido tentaram trazer-nos comida e água e foram detidos pelas forças de segurança", contou.

"Em resultado de uma possível visita de um representante das Nações Unidas, o regime levou os militantes do partido que deteve para prisões desconhecidas", relatou.

A agência Lusa tentou falar com Gabriel Obono, mas não conseguiu estabelecer contacto.

"Se nos levarem, é a morte", alertou María Jesús Mené Bobapé, mulher de Obono, também em declarações à Efe, a partir da sede do partido, uma vivenda com muros altos localizada numa zona degradada na periferia da capital, à qual se pode aceder apenas por uma rua, agora cortada pelos militares.

De acordo com o único partido político da oposição com representação parlamentar na Guiné Equatorial, as Nações Unidas deverão enviar um representante ao país, na próxima semana -- mas esta informação não foi ainda confirmada por fontes da organização.

Os CI pediram às Nações Unidas que, quando visitem o país, intervenham para acabar com o que consideram ser uma repressão política.

A Guiné Equatorial é governada por Teodoro Obiang Nguema Mbasogo desde 1979, entre reiteradas acusações de violação dos direitos humanos e de perseguição a políticos da oposição.

A tensão aumentou no país, membro da Comunidade dos Países de Língua Portuguesa, em finais de dezembro, a seguir a um suposto golpe de Estado, denunciado e alegadamente impedido pelo governo.

Segundo um comunicado a que a Efe teve acesso, o ministro de Estado da Segurança Nacional, Nicolás Obama Nchama, disse que, a 24 de dezembro, um grupo de mercenários de Chade, Sudão e República Centro-Africana entrou nas localidades de Kie Osi, Ebebiyin, Mongomo, Bata e Malabo, a capital, para supostamente atacar o Presidente Obiang.

O Governo acusou a "oposição radical" de ser responsável pela suposta tentativa de golpe, tanto a partir de dentro como de fora do país.

"Estamos a ser vítimas, querem justificar que somos golpistas, quando, na realidade, é uma operação de limpeza do partido", denuncia o líder de CI.

"É uma vingança pessoal. Ele [Obiang] sabe isso perfeitamente. É um ajuste de contas, não fizemos nada. Querem eliminar o partido Cidadãos pela Inovação recorrendo a uma mentira", frisa Obono.

Nas legislativas de novembro, a oposição conseguiu um lugar na Câmara dos Deputados, elegendo Jesús Motogo Oyono. Os restantes 99 lugares parlamentares nas mãos do Partido Democrático da Guiné Equatorial, de Teodoro Obiang Nguema.

SBR (NVI) // VM // LUSA

Na foto: Nsé Obiang Obono, opositor do regime ditatorial de Teodore Obiang / Google

Cidadãos Inconformados da Guiné-Bissau defrontaram polícias em jogo de futebol

Uma partida de futebol juntou hoje membros do Movimento de Cidadãos Inconformados com a crise politica na Guiné-Bissau (MCCI) e Policias de Intervenção Rápida (PIR), até aqui adversários, disse à Lusa Sumaila Djaló, porta-voz dos Inconformados.

O desafio de caráter amistoso proposto pela PIR, no âmbito de um torneio enquadrado nas comemorações do 25.º aniversário daquela corporação, foi aceite pelos Inconformados "como demonstração da boa-fé", precisou Sumaila Djaló.

Para o porta-voz dos Inconformados, o convite também pode ser entendido como "o reconhecimento" do papel daquele grupo de cidadãos que se tem batido em manifestações de rua contra o regime em vigor na Guiné-Bissau, que classificam de ilegal e ditatorial.

Lusa

The Mysterious Death of a Chinese General

What Zhang Yang’s suicide reveals about Xi Jinping’s political situation.

By Don Tse | The Diplomat

General Zhang Yang, the former Political Work Department director of the Central Military Commission (CMC), hanged himself at home on November 25, according to a state media announcement in late November. Zhang became the highest-ranking Chinese official to commit suicide since Xi Jinping launched the anti-corruption campaign in 2013. On December 27, the National People’s Congress posthumously terminated Zhang’s membership to the Chinese legislature.

The official acknowledgment of Zhang Yang’s death confirmed earlier reports and information that he was in trouble. In late August, Zhang and former Chief of Joint Staff Fang Fenghui suddenly vanished from public view, and their names were not included in the list of military delegates to the 19th Party Congress. Chinese and Western media outlets later reported that both generals were being investigated for wrongdoing. The downfall of Zhang and Fang shocked many observers, as they were considered favorite candidates for the two CMC vice chair slots. The announcement that Zhang had ended his life solved the mystery of his whereabouts, but cast his and Fang’s earlier disappearance in a grim light.

The Xi administration’s handling of Zhang’s suicide indicates that his case is likely more serious than the terse official announcement lets on. In a 300-character commentary published after the announcement on November 28, China’s military newspaper, the People’s Liberation Army Daily, criticized Zhang for killing himself to escape punishment for breaking national law and Communist Party discipline. The commentary added that Zhang’s case further emphasized the need to “comprehensively purge the pernicious influence of Guo Boxiong and Xu Caihou” from the system, advance honest government, and persist with the anti-corruption drive. Guo Boxiong and Xu Caihou, both fomer CMC vice chairs, are the highest-ranking military officers to date to fall in Xi’s anti-corruption drive.

On November 29, provincial Party committees held meetings to brief cadres about Zhang’s case. A total of 74 senior generals from the CMC and other commands and units were ordered to attend a study session in Beijing between December 4 to December 9, where they were told to “resolutely obey Chairman Xi’s commands, be responsible to Chairman Xi, and let Chairman Xi be at ease.” Around the same period, leading provincial-level officials were also summoned to Beijing to attend the first of seven rounds of “education courses” on Xi Jinping Thought and the spirit of the 19th Party Congress.

Perhaps more troubling than Zhang Yang’s suicide is the absence of follow up reporting in state media and the top military brass’ radio silence on the issue. While overseas Chinese language news outlets carried details of Zhang’s corruption and promiscuity, state media coverage of Zhang’s case was limited to the announcement of his suicide, the short commentary article, and boilerplate critiques of Zhang from over a dozen provincial Party committees and State Council departments. In contrast, state media went all out to expose disgraced CMC vice chairs Guo Boxiong and Xu Caihou after they were formally investigated, while senior military leaders censured the purged generals in speeches.

Three perplexing questions arise in considering the Chinese authorities’ statement of Zhang’s suicide together with various intelligence and reports.

Suicide or Forced Suicide?

According to Xinhua’s account of Zhang Yang’s suicide, the authorities launched an investigation into his association with Guo and Xu on August 28. Zhang remained in his home during the entire duration of the probe until he committed suicide on November 23.

Two reasonable hypotheses can be drawn from the official statement. In considering CCP conventions, the authorities must have considered Zhang’s crimes not to be very serious if he was allowed to remain at home while being probed. Thus, Zhang committing suicide suggests that the past three months of investigations could have revealed his crimes to be very severe, and he may have chosen to end his life instead of serving a life prison sentence like Guo Boxiong.

The official narrative, however, appears tenuous when viewed alongside foreign media reports and other channels of information about Zhang and Fang Fenghui’s arrest. A September 1 Sankei Shimbun report notes that Zhang and Fang were subjected to shuanggui (a type of informal detention for CCP cadres) at the CMC headquarters (Bayi Building) in Beijing. Fang may have been probed at around the same time as Zhang as he was removed from his post on August 26. Meanwhile, Chinese overseas media report that military anti-corruption officers “visited” Zhang in the vicinity of his “residence” on the day of his death. Zhang reportedly told the officers that he needed to change clothes before hanging himself.

Juxtaposing official and unofficial information brings up some points for consideration.

It is still unclear where Fang Fenghui is being investigated — at home, in the Bayi Building, or at an undisclosed location. If Fang and Zhang were both investigated at home, then they should only be suspected of minor cases of corruption. If this was indeed the case, however, neither general should have been probed in the first place, given their high office and good chances of being promoted to CMC vice chair at the 19th Congress. (Given the prevalence of corruption in the Chinese officialdom, Xi would find himself with very few officials left to govern China if he purged every single official who engaged in malfeasance.) Instead, both generals vanished towards the end of August and didn’t even make the list of delegates to the Congress, a development which suggests that Fang and Zhang had committed offenses severe enough to doom their political careers.

Zhang being probed at home, as Chinese state media reported, doesn’t make sense given his connection with Guo and Xu. Officially, Guo and Xu stand accused of “political and economic crimes” and for being conspirators who sought to “wreck and split the Party.” The latter charge hints at their involvement in a coup against the Xi administration.

An examination of Zhang and Fang’s careers indicates that they owe their promotions to Guo and Xu. From 2004 to 2007, Fang and Zhang were chief of staff and political commissar, respectively, of the Guangzhou Military Region. In 2012, both generals were elevated to corresponding posts in the CMC. It would be impossible for Fang and Zhang to secure promotion if they only had a shallow relationship with Guo and Xu when the latter two were at the peak of their influence.

Finally, the state account of Zhang’s suicide becomes unpersuasive if the information that anti-corruption officers visited Zhang before his death is accurate.

Officially, Zhang killed himself to escape punishment. So did the anti-corruption officers tell Zhang exactly how he would be punished? If not, why hang himself in November, and not during the three prior months of investigation?

Zhang was investigated for his ties with Guo Boxiong and Xu Caihou. Given the gravity of the case, the anti-corruption officers who met with Zhang must be seasoned veterans. So how could the officers be careless enough to give Zhang an opportunity to hang himself?

Even if the anti-corruption officers had let Zhang slip away, the former general would have created a commotion in the process of hanging himself. It is inconceivable that the officers or security agents keeping an eye on Zhang at home would be oblivious to his suicide.

Why Did Military Leaders Stay Silent?

After the announcement of Zhang Yang’s death until November 30, a total of 14 provincial Party committees and three State Council departments condemned Zhang’s suicide and endorsed Xi Jinping’s call to stamp out the “pernicious influence” of Guo Boxiong and Xu Caihou. In contrast, no CMC department nor any of the five military theater commands took to state media to comment on Zhang’s case.

The military radio silence is particularly jarring in light of the responses to the purge of Xu and Guo. After Xu was removed in June 2014 and Guo in July 2015, the General Staff Department, Political Work Department, General Logistics Department, General Armaments Department, PLA Navy, Air Force, Ground Force, Second Artillery Corps, and seven military regions all issued public statements condemning the two ex-CMC vice chairmen. Likewise, the various leading generals and official PLA publications censured Xu and Guo while rallying around Xi after the 19th Party Congress. For the military’s top brass to not react at all to the death of Zhang Yang, an official who was investigated for his links with Xu and Guo, is baffling. Did Beijing issue a gag order to the military? Or is the military expressing discontent with Xi over the Zhang issue? It is not easy to discern from the information currently available.

Zhang Yang’s suicide, however, must have shocked Beijing. Just two weeks before Zhang’s death, the central authorities ordered military leaders at all levels to attend study sessions where Xu, Guo, and Zhang‘s corrupt behavior and extravagant lives were exposed, according to intelligence from mainland China.

Was Zhang Involved in a Coup?

After analyzing the curious political and military developments that unfolded between late July to late August — the purge of Xi “successor” Sun Zhengcai, an unusual parade in Zhurihe Training Base, and the vanishing of Fang Fenghui and Zhang Yang — SinoInsider wrote in September that Xi Jinping could have foiled a coup before the 19th Party Congress. Our analysis appeared to be partially corroborated when Liu Shiyu, the China Securities Regulatory Commission chairman, accused Bo Xilai, Zhou Yongkang, Ling Jihua, Xu Caihou, Guo Boxiong, and the recently arrested Sun Zhengcai of “plotting to usurp the Party leadership” during a meeting at the 19th Congress.

Shortly after making our analysis, Hong Kong media reported that Fang and Zhang were arrested for planning a military coup. According to a report, the two generals had been quietly opposing Xi by protecting Guo and Xu’s former associates, and Xi decided that they should go on “early retirement.” With no prospects for career advancement, Fang and Zhang conspired against the Xi leadership but were purged before they could successfully take action, noted the report. The official statement linking Zhang and the two ex-CMC vice chairs, who have been accused of attempting regime change, suggests that there is some basis in the information from Hong Kong. It would not be a stretch to presume that Fang will eventually be accused of collaborating with Zhang or be outed as an associate of Guo and Xu.

In light of the public information currently available, there is a very good chance that Zhang Yang and Fang Fenghui were involved in a failed coup against the Xi administration. And if Zhang and Fang were coup plotters, then they must already have assembled a sizable group of fellow conspirators.

Conclusion

The Political Work Department continues to be an important office in the PLA despite its status being lowered following the reorganization of the CMC. This is because the PLA is the military force of the CCP, and the Party strives to be in command of its “gun” instead of the other way around. Given the prominence of political work in the PLA, Zhang Yang’s death, regardless of whether he committed suicide or was “forced” to kill himself, is a deeply troubling incident for senior Chinese generals and Xi Jinping.

To the military’s senior leadership, Zhang’s arrest underscores Xi’s conviction to clean out corruption or eliminate his opposition. Earlier, they may have felt that the purge of retired generals Guo Boxiong and Xu Caihou was an inevitable outcome of the factional struggle between Xi and Jiang since Xi needed to preserve his authority and consolidate power. But for Xi to abruptly remove Zhang, an active-duty senior general who was tipped to become a CMC vice chairman, signals that no one is safe. His suicide may have inspired unease in the top military ranks and prompted them to reevaluate their understanding of Xi.

From Xi’s perspective, Zhang’s suicide may leave him with the impression that the Jiang faction’s remaining influence in the military cannot be underestimated. Xi may also become more vigilant against potential coups. If Zhang was not being held at home and was forced to commit suicide, then the political threat Xi faces is considerable.

Don Tse is the CEO and co-founder of SinoInsider Consulting LLC, a consulting and research company based in New York City.

Translated by Larry Ong.

Photo: Zhang Yang, left, and Fang Fenghui, right, stand during the opening session of China's National People's Congress (NPC) at the Great Hall of the People in Beijing (March 5, 2017) | Image Credit: AP Photo/Mark Schiefelbein