Vietnam fought China in the South
China Sea before and it should be ready to do so again.
The visit to Vietnam by the U.S.
Navy aircraft carrier Carl Vinson on March 5 is symbolic on multiple
fronts. It is the first such port call to Vietnam by an American aircraft
carrier since the end of the war in 1975. Plus Da Nang, where the port
call took place, was also the site of the initial U.S. Marine Corps landings on
March 8, 1965. Finally, as some commentators have pointed out, the move
symbolizes the increasingly closer relations between Vietnam and the United
States on the defense and security front, especially following the earlier
decision by Washington to lift the decades-old arms embargo on Hanoi.
Whether this latest visit would
once and for all exorcise the ghosts of the Vietnam War — a protracted, bloody
conflict that inflicted grievous losses on both sides in blood, sweat and
treasure — remains to be seen. But both capitals have been optimistic about the
long-term trajectory of this budding bilateral relationship, which has been
carefully cultivated since the end of the Cold War. That coincided back then
with Hanoi’s recalibrated foreign policy, which favors independence and
nonalignment/alliance, instead embracing a more outward-looking posture aimed
at promoting regional economic integration, which serves the domestic agenda of
“Doi Moi” (Renovation) socioeconomic development process that still continues
today.
The 1988 Spratlys Battle
Another observation about
the Carl Vinson visit is that it took place just about a week before
the 30th anniversary of the Battle of the Johnson South Reef on March 14, 1988.
This episode, along with the earlier Battle of the Paracel Islands in 1974,
which was fought between South Vietnam and China, would not have
been unknown to Vietnamese military planners. These two battles saw
the tactical and strategic defeat of Vietnamese forces at Chinese hands –
Beijing cinched the prizes of occupying the concerned features to this day and
did so at a fraction of the losses inflicted upon Vietnam.
Hanoi certainly harbors no
illusions about a future naval skirmish with Beijing. Both ruffled each other
over the Chinese oil rig HYSY-981 in 2014, in an almost two-month-long standoff
off the Paracels. Though China subsequently removed the platform, which thus
could be painted as a victory for Hanoi, the lessons were hard won. That
episode fortuitously did not escalate into a full-blown shooting clash similar
to the 1988 event, but Vietnamese forces were exhausted by the grueling
showdown. Ultimately, an asymmetry in materiel and manpower between the
maritime forces of the two rivals was just too huge.
In a future standoff with China,
Vietnam would first have to contend with China’s maritime militia and
coast guard on the frontlines. But it is the People’s Liberation Army Navy,
which lurks in the shadows ready to leap forward to back up its paramilitary
counterparts, that is of most concern. The 1988 battle saw the PLA Navy deploy
three frigates – Nanchong, Xiangtan, and Yingtan – pitted
against landing craft and troop transports of the Vietnam People’s Navy. The
results were thus preordained. No way could these lumbering, lightly armed
vessels would fare well against the fast and heavily armed Chinese warships. The
Vietnamese lost three ships and more than 60 men in the short, but sharp
battle.
The China Shadow
China is not doubt looming large
at the back of the minds of the leaders in Hanoi and Washington as they reach
out to each other.
Hanoi has made no bones about its
sense of unease regarding Beijing’s growing material might and in
parallel, its increasing assertiveness. This is evident with China’s
continued militarization of its artificial islands in the South China Sea at
the same time it is putting up “smile diplomacy” outreach to ASEAN and calling
for cooperation, including an agreement to begin formal negotiations on the
proposed Code of Conduct. Vietnam’s concerns about the future of the disputes
were further heightened after the ruling Chinese Communist Party proposed
sweeping reforms to the Chinese Constitution, including the removal of
clauses mandating that the president would serve no more than two terms in
office – thus creating the prospect of Xi Jinping holding onto power for
perpetuity.
One needs no reminder that
China’s muscle flexing in recent years took place under Xi’s watch. This can
only mean the possible likelihood of “business as usual” – and even a worsening
of future scenarios in the South China Sea – under a protracted Xi rule. The
current Sino-ASEAN concord over the disputes is far from assured, and could
take an abrupt turn downhill at any point of time. What appears to remain
constant is Beijing’s incessant buildup in and around the disputed Paracel and
Spratly Island groups. While the “black box” of Chinese policy elites’ true
intentions is always murky, those sprawling bases on the fake islands are an
undeniable fact – clear as crystal.
Therefore, the Carl Vinson visit
is indeed opportune. This ought to be taken as a concerted series of measures
by Hanoi to send a serious signal to its vastly more powerful neighbor up
north. Just before the carrier visit took place, Vietnamese President Tran Dai
Quang called on New Delhi, one of Hanoi’s closest partners. During the visit,
both countries agreed to work together to build “an independent, open and
prosperous Indo-Pacific region” – which seems to bear strong resonance to the
“Free and Open Indo-Pacific” concept championed by Japan, another of Vietnam’s
closest partners.
In recent years, more and more
foreign naval ships have visited Vietnam’s ports. Before the visit of USS Carl
Vinson, numerous Arleigh Burke-class guided-missile destroyers visited
Vietnames ports. Australian, Indian, and Japanese gunboats also made port
calls in Vietnam; notably, last year, the helicopter destroyer JS Izumo(DDH-183)
visited Vietnam in its first overseas voyage. While China builds more aircraft
carriers, Japan had planned to convert the Izumo-class into true aircraft
carriers, which could even bring F-35B fighters to combat. So Izumo’s trip
in the South China Sea appeared to signal a challenge to China.
Last year, Australia sent the
HMAS Ballarat, an Anzac-class guided missile frigate to visit Da
Nang. In September 2017, the Indian Navy’s stealth frigate INS Satpura (F48)
and the anti-submarine warfare corvette INS Kadmatt (P29), carrying a
total of 645 officers, visited Hai Phong city. It is noteworthy that these port
calls were conducted by the four members of the revived quadrilateral security
cooperation framework, the so-called diamond alliance. Together, their warships
have made their presence known in the South China Sea, a bridge to connect the
Indian and Pacific Oceans.
Of Ties and Weapons
Despite all the diplomatic
niceties one could observe taking place since the ASEAN summit in August last
year, the risk of future conflict in the South China Sea endures. While the
prospect of promulgating a Code of Conduct remains uncertain at best,
Hanoi appears certainly to be preparing for the worst. The 1974 and 1988
battles serve as a warnings from history. Yet the geopolitical context is
much different; thus according Hanoi a much wider range of strategic options in
terms of ties and weapons.
Where ties are concerned, the
post-Cold War foreign policy recalibration gives Vietnam a hitherto
never-before-seen berth of avenues with diverse countries. Of course, Hanoi has
strived to maintain its traditional friendships with former communist-bloc
nations, primarily Russia. However, it has also managed to cultivate closer
ties with the West. In the immediate Southeast Asian region, Vietnam no longer
stands out like a “Soviet client” sore thumb, but has been fully accepted as a
member of ASEAN and over the decades proven to be an avid advocate of the
regional bloc and its ideals for a regional security architecture, which
envisages an inclusive approach toward roping in surrounding powers like
Australia, India, Japan, and the United States to own a veritable stake in
Asian peace and stability.
The post-Cold War
environment to this day also opens up to Vietnam another valuable avenue
for its defense capacity-building. While it continues to incline toward Russia
for the bulk of its “big ticket” military items, Vietnam has availed itself of
other sources such as Israel, the Netherlands, and Sweden for niche
capabilities. In the current context, Hanoi needs more time to eventually wean
itself off its heavy reliance on Russian weapons, with the attendant risks
of being cut off from supplies in times of a conflict with China due to
the stronger Sino-Russian strategic ties following the Ukraine crisis in 2014. To
date, through this approach of gradually diversifying its arms sources, Vietnam
has been able to build a more robust military, including a navy that is unlike
its predecessor in 1988.
Realist Calculations in a Future
Contingency
Notwithstanding the vastly
different strategic context Vietnam finds itself situated in today, there is no
room for complacency. Vietnam should expect to fight China again if push ever
comes to shove. Entertaining this prospect is not far-fetched, if one takes it
seriously Beijing’s threat in August 2017 to attack Vietnamese forces in
disputed waters unless Hanoi were to demand that the Spanish energy firm
Repsol stand down from its work in an offshore hydrocarbon block claimed also
by China. Hanoi did capitulate eventually, and Repsol stood down.
But clearly, Vietnam does not
wish to appear weak in front of China. Credibility is at stake, with both
domestic and external repercussions for the ruling elite in Hanoi. And by now,
after seeing the way ASEAN intramural dynamics play out over many years on the
South China Sea disputes, Hanoi would have reached the dire conclusion that the
bloc, if there is ever going to be an outright shooting war with China, would
not offer a united stance except perhaps to issue an obligatory statement
calling upon all sides to cease fighting and negotiate a settlement. Some of
the individual ASEAN member states may even overtly take Beijing’s side, or
just stay neutral. At best Vietnam could rely on ASEAN as a bedrock for
postconflict economic recovery, even though such a prospect is still far from
certain considering the bloc’s economic interdependence with China and possible
economic retaliation by the latter.
It is most likely that Vietnam
would receive support from multiple major powers in times of a war with China
over the South China Sea flashpoint, but not direct military intervention,
especially if Beijing elects to keep the clashes localized and well contained
to avoid provoking an overwhelming international response. As such, Hanoi could
expect those friendly extraregional powers to cheer for it, or at best offer
diplomatic condemnation against Beijing, and possibly some form of materiel and
technical aid for its fighting efforts. But not more than that.
If that fateful day eventually
come, will the United States flex its muscles with a carrier strike group
somewhere close to Chinese shores or near the scene of battle, and will that
make any difference to the outcome? Perhaps, but nobody can be sure.
* Koh Swee Lean Collin is
research fellow with the Maritime Security Programme, at the S. Rajaratnam
School of International Studies, Nanyang Technological University,
Singapore.
* Ngo Minh Tri conducts research
on international security affairs, and is a managing editor of ThanhNien
newspaper in Vietnam.
Photo: Vietnamese protesters
shout slogans while showing an anti-China protest placard during a rally
against China near the Chinese Embassy in Seoul, South Korea (July 24, 2016). Image
Credit: AP Photo/Ahn Young-joon
