Increasing power is not the best
explanation for China’s recent actions.
By Richard Q. Turcsanyi |
The Diplomat
“Chinese assertiveness” has
become an infamous phrase – it is regularly used by media, pundits, and
politicians, yet there is little scholarly work that would clarify the
meaning of the concept. A similar situation exists when it comes to China’s
power. Although it is generally assumed that “China is rising,” there are
surprisingly few systematic studies of China’s power being done comprehensively
and rigorously.
As such, we have ended up with
the proposition that China is “assertive” and that the ongoing “power shift” is
the reason why. In reality, we do not know which Chinese actions,
precisely, fall within the “assertive” label or what this label actually means.
Similarly, we do not know how much power China has acquired, and we are not
even sure how to assess China’s power. Worse, there is not even much
ongoing discussion about these questions.
My recent book Chinese
Assertiveness in the South China Sea addresses these issues. It defines
the concept of “Chinese assertiveness,” establishes what policy actions qualify
to be included, and then tests explanations as to why China conducted such
policies. The South China Sea is taken as the case study since this is the area
where there is nearly a consensus that China acts assertively.
Chinese Assertiveness: What,
When, and Where
To begin with, an “assertive”
action is one when China (in this case) actively pursues its interests and acts
boldly toward achieving its goals, even if they contradict the interests of
other actors. An assertive action by China must be significantly different from
both the actions of other countries and previous norms. Hence, when talking
about Chinese assertiveness, we talk about new and unique Chinese behavior,
which is qualitatively and/or quantitatively different from the behavior of
other countries.
Looking for the policy cases
which fulfil these criteria in the area of the South China Sea, we first notice
that the events from the years 2009-2010 – when the “assertive” discourse
started developing – do not meet them. Only since 2011 can we find cases when
China acted assertively. Altogether, the book identifies five such
examples: cable cutting incidents, the Scarborough Shoal stand-off, the
Second Thomas Shoal stand-off, the oil rig incident, and land reclamation and
militarization of Chinese outposts.
These five cases should serve as
the basis for the study of how and why China acted “assertively” in the
South China Sea.
China’s Power and Its Role
There have been various
explanations dealing with the topic of why China has acted assertively;
however, no rigorous testing has been done so far. The explanation that growing
power of China made it act assertively has been the most influential theory,
and therefore it is also at the center of the book. The book first builds a
comprehensive and multidimensional model of power, which includes three levels
(international, state, domestic) and eights sources of power: military,
economy, national performance, international institutional setting,
geopolitics, position in the international economy, domestic legitimacy, and
soft power.
Based on this model of power, it
was found that in general, China’s power has been growing especially when it
comes to economy and military, but also in terms of international economic
position, domestic legitimacy, and national performance. On the other hand, the
main limitations of China’s power are geopolitics and soft power.
When it comes to the five
assertive cases, only in one case did a newly acquired capability
allow China to move. This was the oil rig incident, when China dispatched its
most advanced and newly acquired deep water drilling technology, and it
protected the operation with newly unified and strengthened paramilitary
forces. In all the remaining four assertive cases, China could have acted in
the same ways years or even decades before. Moreover, major power improvements
notwithstanding, in the years when the assertive behavior took place, China was
still far away from overtaking the United States. In other words, China’s
power did not pass any particular threshold in the “assertive” era.
Furthermore, taking a closer look
at Chinese domestic discussion, neither Chinese leaders nor public opinion saw
China as overtaking the United States. Hence, there was no “power shift” taking
place, and the perception in China was more or less in line with the reality.
Alternative Explanations: Toward
the Theory of ‘Reactive Assertiveness’
After showing that the “power
shift” can explain only one out of five assertive cases, the book takes into
account two alternative hypotheses. Domestic politics is one which has often
been used in various ways to explain Chinese assertiveness – be it the role of
the Xi Jinping, a loss of control by the central leadership, an attempt to
distract from domestic problems, or growing nationalism. None of these
ideas offers a persuasive explanation.
The assertive behavior had
started already at the end of Hu Jintao era, and thus predates Xi. At the same
time, considering the importance of the South China Sea disputes and rapid
centralization of power in Xi’s hands, it is unimaginable that the central
leadership would be losing grip of what is going on in the area. Available
indications show very high levels of public satisfaction in China, both
generally and even when it comes to events such as territorial disputes. Furthermore,
public satisfaction and national performance indicators were improving at the
time of these incidents. Only growing nationalism can be seen as a contributing
factor, yet hardly a trigger.
On the other hand, the other
alternative explanation which was found to be valid for four out of five
assertive events in the South China Sea. In each of these cases, China
responded (assertively) to what it saw as a new development. The immediate
triggers were thus the court ruling in The Hague, Filipino actions at the
Scarborough Shoal (particularly the Philippine Navy’s presence) and the
Second Thomas Shoal (the Philippine attempt to repair its outpost), and
another phase of maritime surveys. Moreover, the assertive actions of China
took place after the United States initiated its “pivot to Asia,” which was
seen in China as worsening of its geopolitical position.
Hence, I argue for the theory of
China’s “reactive assertiveness,” at least when it comes to the events in
the South China Sea. It should be emphasized that this says nothing about
whether China was legitimate or not in its behavior, or whether other claimants
and their actions were devised wisely or not. What is claimed is that in most
assertive actions, China — from its perspective — did not begin to act
assertively as soon as it acquired the power to do so, but only chose to use
its capabilities when it felt the situation required (or allowed) such action. It
also remains an open question, however, as to how the power dynamics in the region
will develop with Donald Trump in place, which can already be assessed as
having a negative impact on American power.
*Richard Q. Turcsanyi, Ph.D. is
an Associate Research Fellow at the Institute of International Relations Prague
and Assistant Professor at Mendel University in Brno. He recently
published the book Chinese
Assertiveness in the South China Sea. Power Sources, Domestic Politics, and
Reactive Foreign Policy
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