First live test kills ballistic missile from Guam’s Pacific outpost, resetting strategic calculus of a US-China war for Taiwan
The US just proved it can shoot down ballistic missiles from Guam, sending a bold message to China as tensions rise over a potential Taiwan war.
This month, The War Zone reported that the US Missile Defense Agency (MDA) conducted its first live intercept of a ballistic missile from Guam on Tuesday (December 10), marking a significant milestone in the Aegis Guam System’s development.
The War Zone mentions that the test, known as Flight Experiment Mission-02 (FEM-02), successfully saw a Standard Missile-3 Block IIA intercept a mock medium-range ballistic missile over 200 nautical miles northeast of the island. It notes the test is a crucial step towards providing 360-degree protection for Guam, a strategic outpost in the Indo-Pacific region.
The report says the Aegis Guam System, featuring a tilting Mk 41 Vertical Launch System (VLS), differs from other Aegis Ashore systems, allowing for greater flexibility in missile launch angles. It notes the test also utilized the AN/TPY-6 radar, showcasing the integrated air and missile defense capabilities being developed for Guam.
The effort is part of a broader initiative to enhance Guam’s defenses against potential threats from China, which has been rapidly expanding its ballistic missile arsenal. It notes the MDA’s ongoing buildup of the Guam Defense System aims to establish a robust, multi-layered defense network involving various US military branches and regional allies to protect this critical asset in the event of a conflict.
Asia Times has previously reported that Guam’s broader Enhanced Integrated Air and Missile Defense (EIAMD) system incorporates Aegis Ashore, Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD), Typhon and Patriot systems for 360-degree protection.
Guam will also deploy the Integrated Battle Command System (IBCS) to unify disparate radar and missile assets into a cohesive network, addressing vulnerabilities in US missile defense kill chains.
However, significant hurdles remain. Guam’s limited land space and mountainous terrain complicate infrastructure development, while the complexity of integrating multiple systems creates risks of uncoordinated responses during saturation attacks involving ballistic, cruise and hypersonic missiles.
Moreover, over-reliance on fixed sensor-to-shooter links may limit adaptability against next-generation threats. China’s potential use of multi-domain attacks—combining cyber, electronic, and kinetic strikes—threatens the integrity of US kill chains.
Apart from these challenges, a finite number of interceptors per system (Aegis, THAAD and Patriot) means that if a large-scale, multi-axis attack occurs, the inventory of available interceptors could be depleted quickly.
In line with that, Megan Eckstein mentions in a February 2024 Defense News article that despite the US Navy’s efforts to ramp up missile production, it faces significant challenges due to supply chain bottlenecks and outdated production capabilities.
Eckstein says the US Navy struggles with insufficient stockpiles of critical munitions like the Long Range Anti-Ship Missile (LRASM), MK 48 torpedo and Standard Missile variants despite dramatically increasing weapons spending.
She mentions that while large defense contractors have expanded their facilities and modernized processes, key suppliers of components such as rocket motors and electronics are unable to meet the increased demand. She notes that while the US Navy’s FY24 budget includes US$380 million to address these bottlenecks, industry executives warn that it will take time to see improvements.
Eckstein points out that the US Navy’s reliance on a limited number of qualified rocket motor manufacturers further complicates efforts to boost output.
Further, Mackenzie Eaglen mentions in a July 2024 article for The National Interest (TNI) that the US Department of Defense’s (DOD) decision to terminate SM-3 Block IB production in favor of the newer SM-3 Block IIA has not been matched with adequate increases in the latter’s procurement, leading to a shortfall in interceptor stockpiles.
Eaglen notes the FY 2025 defense budget cuts planned procurement of SM-3 Block IB from 153 to zero over the next five years, saving US$1.9 billion but not reinvesting these savings into SM-3 Block IIA production, which remains stagnant at 12 missiles annually.
He points out that while a projected ramp-up in SM-6 procurement slightly offsets this inadequate order, overall missile production remains insufficient to meet the US Navy’s needs.
As with Eckstein, Eaglen says the chronic preference for smaller procurement quantities and the reliance on a limited number of qualified rocket motor manufacturers further complicate efforts to boost output.
To address those challenges, the US Navy released an industry Request for Information (RFI) in July 2024 to assess the production capabilities for SM-6 rocket motors, specifically the MK72 booster and MK104 dual thrust rocket motor, to enhance fleet defense.
In its July 2024 RFI, the US Navy seeks details on these production efforts’ affordability and technical readiness, aiming for acquisition in the FY26-FY27 timeframe or sooner.
Further, the resupply of missiles, fuel and spare parts for interceptors, radar systems and communications equipment is logistically complex. In a prolonged conflict, Guam could face resupply delays due to disruption of maritime supply lines.
China has been actively increasing its footprint in the South Pacific, aiming to expand its regional presence. Some analysts suggest that threatens to cut access between Guam, Australia, New Zealand and the US.
Grant Newsham mentions in Asia Times that China is expanding its influence in the South Pacific through a comprehensive strategy of political, economic and military encroachment.
Newsham says that while the US is focused on rebuilding airfields and dispersing forces under the Agile Combat Employment (ACE) strategy, China is leveraging political warfare to undermine the US presence.
He notes that China has established dual-use infrastructure, such as casinos and ports, in US territories like the Commonwealth of Northern Mariana Islands and is financing airport renovations in Kiribati.
He says that in the Federated States of Micronesia, China is constructing airfields that mirror US efforts, while China aims to sway Palau’s political leadership in its favor through investments.
Newsham notes that Chinese telecom giant Huawei’s towers and port redevelopment in the Solomon Islands support the latter’s China-friendly regime. He also says an East Timor airfield built with US funds could eventually become a “gift” for China.
Newsham says China’s approach to these South Pacific states includes bribery, diplomatic deals and propaganda, often outmatching US efforts.
Photo: The US ballistic missile intercept in Guam, December 10, 2024. Photo: US Missile Defense Agency
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