The
placement of Iskander-M Brigades in Russia’s Eastern Military District reflects
continued uneasiness about China.
By Guy
Plopsky | The Diplomat
In
early June 2017, Russian media reported that
yet another Ground Forces missile brigade received the dreaded road-mobile
9K720 Iskander-M missile system (known in Russian military parlance as an
“operational-tactical missile system,” or OTRK in short). The brigade in
question is the 29th Army’s newly established 3rd Missile Brigade, based in
Russia’s colossal Eastern Military District (MD). Formed in December 2016, this
brigade was initially
armed with the aging 9K79-1 Tochka-U tactical ballistic missile
system, and became the Eastern MD’s fourth missile brigade to be re-equipped
with the Iskander-M as part of the Russian Defense Ministry’s plan to phase out all Tochka-Us by 2020. The district’s three other
brigades — the 107th, 103rd and 20th — received their
Iskander-M OTRKs in 2013, 2015, and 2016, respectively. As a result,
there are presently more Iskander-M brigades in the Eastern MD than any other
district; Russia’s other three military districts (Central, Southern, and
Western) currently house two Iskander-M brigades each. What, then, is the
purpose of these four brigades?
Whereas
the task of Iskander-M OTRKs being deployed in Russia’s Western MD is to hold
U.S. and allied forces in the Baltics and Poland at risk, the systems stationed
in the Eastern MD appear to primarily serve a different purpose: strengthening
both Russia’s conventional and nuclear deterrence against China. Indeed, while
an Iskander-M system stationed in Russia’s Kaliningrad Oblast allows Russia to
target a wide range of NATO military assets, including the Aegis Ashore
ballistic missile defense (BMD) system in Poland, an Iskander-M stationed in
Russia’s Far East has very limited ability to threaten U.S. forces deployed in
the region.
According
to Russian sources, the Iskander-M’s 9M723-series of quasi-ballistic missiles
have a range of 400-500 kilometers (250-310 miles), while the 9M728/R-500
ground-launched cruise missile (GLCM) — frequently erroneously referred to
as the Iskander-K — possesses a range of under 500 km. This largely restricts
the Iskander-M to targets on Japan’s Hokkaido Prefecture, leaving key U.S.
military assets, including the AN/TPY-2 BMD radar in Japan’s Amoroi Prefecture
and the Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) system in South Korea,
beyond the system’s reach. A possible exception is Misawa Air Base in the east
of Aomori Prefecture; however, targeting this facility would require deploying
the Iskander-M to the southern tip of Kunashir Island in the Kurils.
In
this regard, the Kremlin no longer permanently bases missile brigades within
close proximity to Japan as it did during the Cold War (the USSR maintained a
missile brigade on the southern section of Sakhalin Island in
Yuzhno-Sakhalinsk). The two Iskander-M brigades in Russia’s Far East — the
107th and 20th — are based in the Jewish Autonomous Oblast and Primorsky Krai,
respectively. Both of these regions border China. The latter region also
encompasses Russia’s 17 km (10.5 mile) land border with North Korea, suggesting
that the primary purpose of the two far eastern brigades is containing China
and responding to contingencies on the Korean Peninsula.
At
the same time, the basing locations of the Eastern MD’s other two Iskander-M
brigades likewise point to a focus on China; the 103rd Missile Brigade is
stationed in Russia’s Republic of Buryatia, which borders Mongolia, while the
newly formed 3rd Missile Brigade is based in Gorny (once
known as Chita-46) in Zabaykalsky Krai — a region that borders China’s Inner
Mongolia Province.
Though
the Kremlin has been careful not to voice long-term concerns about China,
perhaps the most telling examples of Moscow’s continued uneasiness regarding
the growing military might of its neighbour have been large-scale Russian
military exercises held in the Eastern MD. As Dr. Roger N. McDermott, senior
fellow in Eurasian military studies at the Jamestown Foundation, concludes in
his analysis on the large-scale Vostok (“East”) 2014
exercise involving some 100,000 personnel, “Vostok 2014, much like
its earlier incarnation in 2010, contains strong evidence that the Russian
General Staff continues to consider China a potential threat to Russia.” Given
the persisting concern, basing Iskander-M OTRKs in regions bordering China’s
Northern Theater Command is a logical move from Russia’s perspective. Indeed,
the system’s ability to deliver a wide range of cluster munitions makes it
particularly suitable for use against People’s Liberation Army (PLA) armor and
infantry in the event of an armed confrontation.
Furthermore,
the Iskander-M is also able to deliver various non-cluster warheads with a
relatively high degree of accuracy — a capability which Russian officials have
repeatedly praised the system for, including during military exercises in the
Eastern MD. Reporting to Russian President Vladimir Putin on the launch of
Iskander-M quasi-ballistic missiles during Vostok 2014 (which took place from a test range in the Jewish Autonomous
Oblast), Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu announced that
“Iskander-M units hit two targets at a distance of 200 km (124 miles),” adding
that “[t]he combat crews demonstrated outstanding practical skills, including
precision in hitting targets.” Similarly, in August 2016, Russia’s Defense
Ministry boasted that a missile launched by an Iskander-M unit
from the Jewish Autonomous Oblast during a military exercise scored a “direct
hit” against a simulated target some 300 km (186 miles) away in the neighboring
Amur Oblast. The participation of the Iskander-M and other advanced strike
systems in these and other military exercises across Russia appears to reflect
Moscow’s understanding that precision-strike capabilities must play a
greater role in future military operations against both non-state and
state actors, including China, which has been actively bolstering its own
precision-strike capabilities.
At
the same time, the Iskander-M’s ability to deliver nuclear payloads reinforces
Russia’s nuclear “de-escalation” doctrine, which aims to deter an adversary
from engaging in hostilities by threatening to retaliate with a limited nuclear
strike. Given Russia’s eroding conventional military superiority over the PLA,
nuclear weapons, particularly non-strategic systems such as the Iskander-M, are
likely to play an increasingly important role in deterring China. Indeed, as
Dr. Alexei Arbatov and Major General Vladimir Dvorkin (Ret.) observe in
a 2013 Carnegie Endowment for International Peace report, “it may be assumed
that Russia’s strategic nuclear forces, as well as some of its non-strategic
nuclear weapons, do serve a mission of containing China.”
Commenting
on Russia’s 2010 Military Doctrine, which states that “[n]uclear weapons will
remain an important factor for preventing the outbreak of nuclear military
conflicts and military conflicts involving the use of conventional means of
attack (a large-scale war or regional war),” the two experts conclude that
“[i]n terms of military logic, to mention a regional war in such a context can
only suggest a hypothetical conflict with China.” Russia’s 2014 Military
Doctrine reiterates the 2010’s statement on the use of nuclear
weapons, indicating Moscow continues to adhere to this line of thought.
All
of the above notwithstanding, Iskander-M brigades in Russia’s Eastern MD merit
close watch by the United States given the possibility of missiles with longer
ranges being fielded with this OTRK that would enable it to hold U.S. assets in
the region at risk. Such missiles would also fail to comply with the 1987
Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty, which bans ballistic missiles
and GLCMs with ranges of 500-5,500 km (310-3,417 miles). In fact, Russian
officials have previously stated that the range of the Iskander-M’s R-500
GLCM could
be extended if deemed necessary. Moreover, it is possible that an upgraded GLCM for the Iskander-M is already under
development or operational. However, it should be noted that even if such a
GLCM does exist, it remains unclear whether its range exceeds 500 km and whether it is affiliated with a new Russian GLCM that
allegedly violates the INF Treaty (dubbed SSC-8 by NATO).
Recent
developments further support the possibility of Russia extending the
Iskander-M’s reach (if it hasn’t done so already). In April 2017, the director
general of Russia’s Rostec Corporation, Sergey Chemezov, notedthat “a
modernized variant of the Iskander-M OTRK will be presented after 2020.” Though
Chemezov did not provide additional details, a meeting held between the head of
Russia’s Missile and Artillery Troops and representatives of Russia’s military
industry a month later shed further light on the potential improvements to the
system. According to Russia’s Defense Ministry, the meeting
discussed the question of developing new missiles with improved range
and accuracy for the Iskander-M. Should Moscow introduce new longer range
missiles for the Iskander-M (and/or for a new road-mobile missile system) in
its Eastern MD, they will strengthen Russia’s position vis-a-vis China, which
fields both ballistic missiles and GLCMs with greater ranges than those
currently in use with the Iskander-M. However, the deployment of such missiles
will also have serious implications for regional stability.
* Guy
Plopsky holds an MA in International Affairs and Strategic Studies from Tamkang
University, Taiwan. He specializes in air power, Russian military affairs and
Asia-Pacific security. You can follow him on Twitter.
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