The
PLA is set to become the largest “American” military force to pose a threat to
the U.S.
By Don
Tse*
Two
Chinese armored brigades clashed in a week-long training exercise at the
Zhurihe Training Base in Inner Mongolia in 2015. Both brigades were equipped
with identical armored vehicles and weapons. The Blue opposing forces brigade
(OPFOR), however, was organized and fought in the fashion of a United States
brigade combat team.
The
Red friendly force was crushed. “Within an hour we were hit with airstrikes,
enemy satellite reconnaissance, and cyberattacks … Frankly, I never imagined it
would be this hard,” said Wang Ziqiang, the armored brigade commander of the
Red force. Wang’s political commissar Liu Haitao was caught on camera sobbing
after the defeat. In a
documentary aired
on state television days before the 19th Party Congress in October, Liu said
that his unit was initially very confident of victory over the Blue team, which
was formerly a sister unit. “But over the course of seven days, we were beaten
… we lost because we didn’t meet realistic combat standards when training our
troops,” he said.
Subpar
training tells only part of the story. Between 2014 and 2016, the “American”
Blue team scored a total of 32 victories and one defeat against Red forces that
comprised some of the best and most well-equipped units in the People’s
Liberation Army (PLA). On average, Red forces sustained 70 percent simulated
casualties after clashing with the Blue team. The PLA’s poor performance
against a modern military unit gave President and Commander-in-Chief Xi Jinping
sufficient reason to seek an overhaul.
In
September 2015, Xi announced sweeping military reforms that included a 300,000
troop cut, the creation of a joint command structure that has
drawn comparisons with the United States’s
Goldwater-Nichols Act, and a military-civilian integration program that appears
to draw inspiration from the American military-industrial complex. During his
speech at the 19th Party Congress, Xi set three goals for the PLA: By 2020,
achieve basic mechanization, make significant progress in using information
technology, and elevate strategic ability; by 2035, become a modernized defense
and military force; by 2050, become a world-class military.
If
Xi is can fully implement his reforms while successfully fending off military
and political opponents, the PLA should most closely resemble the U.S. military
in terms of organization and chain of command. The reformed PLA, however, is
unlikely to best the U.S. military in a conventional war given its
technological gap and lack of warfighting experience. But factor in
unconventional warfare tactics and next-generation technology, and the PLA may
stand a chance of rivaling the world’s strongest fighting force.
Reasons
for Reform
Xi’s
military reforms appear to be driven by two factors: China’s need as an
aspiring world power for a modern military that can fight and win wars, and Xi’s
need to consolidate power in the Chinese Communist Party (CCP).
The
former factor is the more obvious of the two. While previous CCP leaders had
carried out some military reform and updated the military’s weaponry, the PLA
had long remained organized along the Soviet model. Combat tactics and doctrine
didn’t differ much from the low-tech, ground forces-heavy style utilized during
the 1950 Korean War. While militaries around the world had been moving toward
joint service operations since the 1980s, the army was still the most prominent
service branch in the PLA. The navy and air force played an auxiliary role.
From
a national defense and overseas security standpoint, the relative backwardness
of the PLA is a pressing concern for the Xi administration. China has
pledged hundreds of billions of dollars for its Belt
and Road Initiative, a major transnational development strategy to promote
trade between China and Eurasian countries through an overland route and a
maritime route. The PLA also periodically faces border issues with India and
Vietnam, and maritime run-ins with neighboring countries in the South China
Sea. And in the east, China has to contend with a nuclear-capable North Korea
whose leadership is
aligned with Xi’s political rivals.
The
need for modern tactics and joint operations was firmly impressed upon the
commanders who participated in or observed the training exercises in Zhurihe. Previously,
training exercises were formulaic affairs that usually ended up with friendly
Red teams defeating Blue teams made up of rotated units. Xi, however, required
a professional OPFOR to test the combat effectiveness of PLA units more
rigorously. So the 195th mechanized infantry brigade under commander Xia
Minglong underwent reorganization between 2013 and April 2014 to serve as a
dedicated Blue team. State media hinted that the “foreign combat
doctrine” embraced by the Blue team was similar to that of the U.S.
military, and its organization should more closely resemble a U.S. combat
brigade.
A
typical training exercise at Zhurihe would see the Blue team launch nuclear
strikes, carpet bombing runs, and electronic attacks against the attacking Red
force, as well as conduct nightly raids. Special forces tactics were also
utilized — Blue team troops impersonating local government representatives
delivering goodwill provisions to a Red team force successfully met with and
captured their commander. While the Blue team was equipped with outdated Type
59 main battle tanks and Type 63 armored troop carriers, it is likely that they
were simulated as M1 Abrams and Bradley Fighting Vehicles using multiple
integrated laser engagement systems. Lastly, the Blue team usually emerged
overwhelmingly victorious as both a defender or aggressor force.
The
sobering performance of the various PLA units at Zhurihe seemed to be
sufficient for Xi to convince the top PLA brass to adopt deep reforms for the
military to stay relevant. The reforms that have been rolled out thus far
appear to largely take reference from the United States:
- The
Central Military Commission (CMC) was reorganized to accommodate a permanent
joint command and control structure. This is reflected in the abolishing of the
four General Departments and the creation of 15 new departments, as well as
inclusion of top naval and air force generals in the CMC of the 19th Central
Committee.
- The
chain of command was separated into an operational chain and an administrative
chain. For instance, the new military theaters oversee combat preparations,
while the service branch headquarters see that the various units are organized,
trained, and equipped for missions.
- The
PLA is now organized around brigade combat teams as opposed to divisions.
China’s
new civilian-military integration program is geared toward the development of a
military-industrial complex like the United States’
- On
November 10, the CMC announced regulations governing the creation of a new
civilian service.
- On
November 24, state media announced the piloting of a military professional
education program.
Operationally,
the PLA may more closely resemble the U.S. military after reform, albeit with a
Leninist dual command structure that allows the CCP to retain full control over
the troops.
The
success of Xi’s military reforms, however, hinges on his efforts to consolidate
power in the CCP. While Xi emerged from the 19th Party Congress with
greater authority, he still faces resistance from the
influential Jiang Zemin faction. Top CMC members and the PLA newspaper continue
to stress the importance of cleaning out the “pernicious influence of Guo
Boxiong and Xu Caihou,” two former CMC vice chairs and Jiang faction elites,
from the military. Many of the other 64 top ranking generals who were purged
under Xi’s anti-corruption campaign are also associated with the Jiang faction.
Furthermore, there might be senior military leaders who aren’t clearly linked
with the Jiang faction but are unhappy with Xi — Hong Kong media
reported that vanished former CMC members Fang Fenghui
and Zhang Yang (who was later confirmed to have committed suicide) were
dissatisfied with Xi’s military reforms. Perhaps the best indicator that Xi is
genuinely worried about internal resistance is the inclusion of CMC Discipline
Inspection chief Zhang Shengmin in a
downsized CMC.
China
vs. The United States: The Gap
The
PLA should become a modernized fighting force if Xi is successful in
implementing his reforms, but it will unlikely surpass the U.S. military in a
conventional skirmish.
Every
year, America spends 3.3 percent of its GDP (about $611 billion in 2016) to
develop and maintain a military force that is widely regarded as the strongest
in the world. In terms of equipment, the U.S. military has 10 aircraft
carriers, combat-proven vehicles like the M1 Abrams tank and the Apache
helicopter, next-generation fighter jets like the F-35, advanced military
communications satellites, and about 6,800 nuclear warheads. There are about
1.3 million active-duty personnel, of which under 200,000 are deployed
overseas. Training standards and professionalism are high, and U.S. troops have
participated in conflicts around the world since World War II.
In
contrast, China spends just 1.9 percent of its GDP (about $216 billion in 2016)
on its military. China’s defense ministry acknowledges a “definite gap” between
the PLA’s military technology and that of other developed countries. For
instance, China’s maiden aircraft carrier, the Liaoning, is a
refurbished Soviet-era steam turbine vessel, while the PLA’s next-generation
fighter jet, the J-31,
lacks an advanced engine to fly at the supersonic
speeds of an F-35. The Type 99 is a modern main battle tank, but it hasn’t been
combat-tested. And except for a handful of senior commanders who fought in
China’s disastrous war against Vietnam in 1979, most of the PLA’s 2
million-strong military is lacking in combat experience. Worse, the PLA has to
overcome a severe professionalism problem: Under Jiang Zemin’s era of dominance
(1997-2012), senior military officials had to
bribe their way up the ranks, training exercises were
routine and conducted for show and profit, and the military had a problem
with
binge drinking.
Bypassing
the Gap
To
match or even surpass the United States, the modernized PLA will resort to the
unconventional means that it has already been experimenting with in recent
years.
In
his bestselling book
The Hundred-Year Marathon, Pentagon consultant Michael
Pillsbury described simulated war games between the American military and the
PLA where the Chinese side “was the victor” whenever it “employed Assassin’s
Mace methods.” Assassin’s Mace, or shashoujian, are weaponry that the PLA
has developed to cripple or bypass technologically superior militaries. Such
weaponry includes anti-satellite and anti-aircraft carrier missiles,
high-powered microwave and electromagnetic pulse weapons, and radar jammers. Because
Assassin’s Mace weapons are far cheaper than carriers or next-generation
fighter jets, they are a cost-effective way for the PLA to gain an advantage
over more powerful militaries that rely on satellites, networks, and the
internet for communications.
Getting
China-manufactured components into the high-tech military hardware of other
countries is another way that the PLA can gain an edge. Microchips made in
China are known to be counterfeit in some cases or actual spyware in others. In
2010, the U.S. Navy found that it had bought
59,000 fake computer microchipsfrom China. These chips were
meant for use in missiles, fighter planes, warships, and other equipment. Reuters
reported in 2014 that the Pentagon had approved the
use of Chinese magnets in the construction of the F-35’s sensitive hardware. In
the best case scenario, the made-in-China parts work as advertised and no harm
is done. In the worst case scenario, the Chinese parts could cause catastrophic
system failure or serve as surveillance devices for the PLA.
Perhaps
more disturbing is what the PLA could potentially develop. Stuart Russell,
an artificial intelligence scientist at the University of California in
Berkeley, released a
short film on November 13 which highlighted the
devastating capabilities of fictional autonomous “slaughter bots” — using tiny
weaponized AI drones, malicious figures eliminate politicians and activists in
broad daylight. Russell’s vision of the future is stark, but China could make
it a reality. Presently, China is at the forefront of drone manufacturing and
has a sizable slice of the civilian drone market (Dajiang Innovation alone
has
70 percent of the global market share). Meanwhile, Beijing
plans to spend $100 billion to grow its semiconductor industry under a
Made in
China 2025 program. It is not inconceivable that the PLA could eventually
develop advanced AI-powered drones and put them to use, even if their ethical
use becomes a concern. The CCP has proven that it has no scruples about
crushing “anti-revolutionaries” (political opponents, students at Tiananmen,
ethnic minorities, and religious groups), and its military will likewise pursue
asymmetrical hybrid warfare tactics to achieve its ends against external foes.
Finally,
the PLA is a legitimate cybersecurity threat. In recent years, PLA cyber units
have successfully breached the networks of U.S. businesses, infrastructure
companies, and the government. In May 2014, the U.S. Justice Department
announced indictments against five members of the
former General Staff Department’s Unit 61398 for hacking Westinghouse Electric,
the United States Steel Corporation, and other companies. Chinese hackers
backed by the state also allegedly
breached the computer system of the U.S. Office of
Personnel Management, compromising the private data of its 4 million current
and former government employees. Militaries that rely on cyber networks for
communications may find their operations severely hampered in a conflict with
the PLA.
This
year, four U.S. Navy vessels were involved in collisions in the East China Sea.
Internal investigations indicated that crew negligence was to blame. But the
particularly severe collisions of destroyers USS Fitzgeraldand the
USS John S. McCain with commercial ships, as well as the frequency
and close timing of the accidents, have led government investigators and
technology experts to consider the possibility of the warships being
targeted by cyber attacks. If cyber sabotage is indeed a
reason for the collisions, then the PLA is suspect.
Conclusion
Xi
Jinping’s military reforms appear to draw inspiration from the U.S. military,
and serve the dual purpose of modernizing the PLA and consolidating his control
over the CCP. A modernized PLA will unlikely surpass the United States in a
conventional engagement, but the outcome will scale toward the PLA if it uses
unconventional tactics and weapons. In this scenario, the PLA is set to become
the largest “American” military force to pose a threat to the U.S.
*Translated
by Larry Ong.
Don
Tse is the CEO and co-founder of SinoInsider Consulting LLC, a consulting and
research company based in New York City.
*Larry
Ong is a senior analyst with SinoInsider Consulting LLC.
Photo:
Chinese soldiers shout slogans as Chinese President Xi Jinping inspects the
troops of People's Liberation Army (PLA) Hong Kong Garrison (June 30, 2017).
Image
Credit: AP Photo/Kin Cheung
