Governu Atu Kria Mekanizmu Apoiu Populasaun Afetadu Dezastre Naturál

DILI, (TATOLI) – Sekretáriu Estadu Protesaun Sivíl, Alexandrinho de Araújo, hasoru Primeiru-Ministru (PM), Taur Matan Ruak, iha Palásiu Governu hodi ko’alia kona-ba apoiu ba populasaun afetadu dezastre naturál.

“Ohin ha’u ko’alia ho Primeiru-Ministru kona-ba dezastre naturál ne’ebé mak afeta ba ita nia populasaun sira iha munisípiu hotu. Agora oinsá mak atu prepara mekanizmu apoiu ba populasaun ne’ebé mak afetadu ba dezastre naturál”, tenik Alexandrinho ba jornalista sira hafoin hasoru malu, ohin.

Governante ne’e hatutan mekanizmu mak presiza dadus ne’ebé mak tenke mai husi munisípiu rasik, hafoin hamutuk ho pontu fokál sira ne’ebé mak estabelese ona iha 2016, nune’e dadus sira bele kredível no mai husi odomatan ida de’it.

“Apoiu seluk haree liu ba dezastre ne’ebé intervensaun dahuluk presiza iha, hafoin haree dadus para bele halo kontrusaun uma ne’ebé aat. Dadus ne’ebé iha sei provizóriu, iha 500 uma resin, maibé dadus sira sei verifika fali”, informa.

Nia dehan parte ministériu husu atu bele aselera dadus sira, tanba populasaun hein hela.

Kestaun ne’e, nia relata enkontru ohin ho PM fó ordem segunda oin bele enkontru ho protesaun sivíl, estatál, sosiál no instituisaun relevante atu bele kria komité ida atu bele servisu hamutuk halo verifikasaun ba dadus, nune’e bele tulun povu ne’ebé mak afetadu.

Hodi dehan tan agora dadauk iha apoiu umanitáriu, hanesan ai-han, alende ne’e mós mobiliza ajénsia internasionál sira, atu halo konstrusaun ba uma aat, tanba ne’e presiza prepara lona ba populasaun sira.

Jornalista: Julia Chatarina | Editora: Rita Almeida

Imajen: Anin sobu uma lima iha aldeia 12 de Outubru, suku Komoro, postu administrativu  Dom Aleixo, Munisípiu Dili. Dokumentasaun Tatoli/Agapito dos Santos

Presidente timorense defende investimento na componente naval das forças de defesa

Hera, Timor-Leste, 12 jan (Lusa) - O Presidente da República timorense defendeu hoje investimento adequado na componente naval das forças de defesa do país, especialmente em navios com "capacidades flexíveis e polivalentes" para garantir a proteção dos recursos marítimos e da soberania nacional.

"As Marinhas são dispendiosas, mas constituem um investimento necessário. Não as mantendo, facilmente desaparecem", disse hoje Francisco Guterres Lu-Olo em Hera, a leste da capital timorense.

"Não nos podemos dar ao luxo de duplicar meios, razão pela qual importa dispor do financiamento adequado para investir na componente naval em navios com capacidades flexíveis e polivalentes capazes de assegurarem um leque amplo de missões e para realizar todas as ações de manutenção necessárias à prontidão operacional destes meios", afirmou.

Lu-Olo falava na zona de Hera, a leste de Díli, nas comemorações do 17.º Aniversário da Componente Naval das Forças de Defesa de Timor-Leste (F-FDTL).

O chefe de Estado considerou que a ação da componente naval é "fundamental para a segurança e para a atividade marítima de Timor-Leste" e que, por isso, "importa melhorar as necessárias condições de manutenção em terra da frota naval e prosseguir com o reforço da capacidade de vigilância e fiscalização dos espaços marítimos sob soberania e jurisdição do Estado de Timor-Leste".

"Este grande desafio exige que o Estado dê a devida prioridade ao mar, garantindo a sua boa governação", afirmou.

A escassez de recursos, disse, obriga à criação de um modelo de Sistema Nacional de Autoridade Marítima "adequado à realidade timorense que garanta a colaboração de todas as entidades e instituições civis, militares e policiais, públicas ou privadas, que possam contribuir para um ambiente de segurança marítima".

"Nesse sentido, a legislação nacional tem vindo a reforçar o modelo de duplo uso, em que a componente naval desempenha as típicas tarefas militares, em paralelo com tarefas não militares, ligadas à segurança marítima e ao exercício da autoridade pública no mar", disse.

O chefe de Estado reiterou a importância do mar como "desígnio nacional e estratégico e como uma das prioridades nacionais", mas recordou os desafios que a construção da componente naval tem enfrentado.

"Não foi e não é tarefa fácil transformar guerrilheiros, habituados a uma luta de sobrevivência, numas Forças Armadas convencionais e, muito menos, transformá-los em marinheiros qualificados para servir no mar. Contudo, apesar de Timor-Leste não ter tradição de mar, já conseguimos algum sucesso no desafio da transformação de mentalidades", acrescentou.

Com uma costa de 700 quilómetros e recursos marítimas importantes, relembrou Lu-Olo, o Estado deve "proteger o mar e criar condições para que passe a desempenhar também um papel importante no desenvolvimento socioeconómico do país e, em especial, na vida das populações costeiras".

"Comemorar o Dia da Componente Naval é também afirmar a importância estratégica do mar, sendo este um dos maiores desafios do nosso País: a forma como encarar a sua relação com o mar", disse.

"A ausência do exercício de soberania em águas de Timor-Leste foi sempre um problema presente. É portanto, essencial garantir a ocupação efetiva dos espaços sob soberania e jurisdição nacional, evitando vazios que outros tenderão a preencher", sustentou.

Durante as cerimónias de hoje foram plantadas 10 arvores -- de 200 distribuídas pelo Ministério da Agricultura e Pescas --, simbolizando a necessidade de proteger o ambiente do país.

"Quero também chamar a atenção dos militares para a importância de cuidarmos da natureza para que possamos continuar a viver em ambiente saudável.  Proteger a natureza é um dos compromissos assumidos por mim, no dia da minha tomada de posse", disse.

ASP // JMC

Xi Jinping’s bold statements often backfire

By XUAN LOC DOAN | Asia Times

Since coming to power in 2012 and especially after consolidating his power in 2017, President Xi Jinping has positioned himself as the man mandated to rejuvenate China and lead the Middle Kingdom to a new era of greatness. As such, in both rhetoric and policy, he has made numerous big statements, but it’s often the case that such moves backfire on his country.

At the 19th National Congress of the Communist Party of China in October 2017, the strongman leader proclaimed that his country “has stood up, grown rich, and is becoming strong” and “with an entirely new posture, now stands tall and firm in the East.”

With such confidence, in that three-and-a-half-hour speech, Xi announced his country had entered “a new era” in which the Chinese nation will “realize [its] dream of national rejuvenation” and “that sees China moving closer to [the world’s] center stage.”

In a very nationalist addressto the National People’s Congress (NPC), the one-party nation’s rubber-stamp parliament, in March 2018, he reasserted such claims.

In both these key speeches, he also hailed “socialism with Chinese characteristics,” calling it Chinese wisdom, approach, solution and strength to the world.

Xi made such bold statements at the CPC’s quinquennial congress and the NPC’s annual meeting because at those two key events, he stunningly consolidated his power, making him China’s most powerful leader since Mao Zedong, who ruled the People’s Republic with absolute power and at times an iron fist from its founding in 1949 to his death in 1976.

The 2017 congress – aka Xi Jinping’s congress – enshrined “Xi Jinping Thought on Socialism with Chinese Characteristics for a New Era” in the party charter at its 2018 meeting. The NPC amended the PRC’s constitution to include his thought and remove the presidential term-limit, allowing him to rule the country indefinitely.

Rejuvenating China

To demonstrate that he is the man capable of rejuvenating China and leading it into a new era and, thereby justifying his extraordinary power grab and indefinite rule, in policy terms, he initiated and pursued grandiose projects. “Made in China 2025,” a flagship policy aimed at transforming “China into a world science and technology leader” and the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), an ambitious global infrastructure project, which he himself dubbed “a project of the century,” are two of these.

Xi’s propagandists also fawningly praised him, his leadership and achievements. State broadcaster China Central Television produced “Amazing China,” a documentary film, to hail China’s huge accomplishments in many areas, including science and technology, under his watch.

All of this fueled strong suspicion, apprehension and opposition in the United States and other countries. The US government has adopted a hardline posture vis-à-vis China since June 2018, partly, if not mainly, due to Xi’s overbearing stance.

Last September, the European Parliament adopted a resolution that was very critical of a wide range of China’s domestic and foreignpolicies under Xi, including the BRI, while the European Commission unveiled a new “Connectivity Strategy” widely seen as the EU’s answer to China’s BRI.

Xi has also faced disquiet, discontent and dissent in China. Deng Pufeng, the eldest son of Deng Xiaoping, the architect of China’s reform and opening, and who advised Chinese leaders to maintain a low profile, urged the Asian nation to “keep a sober mind” and “know its place.” That Deng Pufeng, who is, like Xi Jinping, a princeling, made such remarks in the tightly-controlled country and that his comments were published show how the Chinese elite and public disapprove of Xi’s assertiveness.

Due to such pushbacks, in recent months Xi’s China has become less assertive in some key areas – at least at the rhetoric level. The phrases, such as that China “has stood up, grown rich, and is becoming strong,” haven’t appeared in Xi’s latest remarks. Beijing has downplayed the “Made in China 2025” scheme.  The BRI, which had been omnipresent in Xi’s key international speeches since its conception in 2013, was conspicuously excluded from his remarks at the G20 summit in Argentina last month.

Yet, while seemingly softening his stance on these issues, Xi has continued to be assertive and aggressive on others.

In remarks to mark the 40th anniversary of a key policy statement that led to a thaw in relations with Taiwan on January 2, he declared that Taiwan “must and will be reunited” with the PRC.

While stating that Beijing is seeking “peaceful reunification with utmost sincerity and greatest efforts,” he said the mainlanders “make no promise to renounce the use of force and reserve the option of taking all necessary means” to bring the island into their fold.

Put differently, he bluntly told the Taiwanese to reunify with the mainland, or if you don’t, we will use arms to attack you. Thus, his so-called “Message to Compatriots in Taiwan” is, in fact, a threat.

In his statement Xi also made other comments that were unacceptable to the Taiwanese people and the Tsai Ing-wen government in particular. These included Beijing’s willingness to hold talks with only political parties in Taiwan that hold the so-called “1992 Consensus” and its proposal of “one country, two systems” as the best way to achieve reunification.

As such, instead of convincing the island to reunify with the mainland, Xi’s comments have made the former more determined to defend its sovereignty, identity, democracy and liberty.

More crucially, instead of weakening President Tsai Ing-wen, who Beijing loves to hate, Xi’s remarks have provided her with a unique opportunity to galvanize domestic and international support for her policies.

Indeed, immediately after Xi’s speech, Taiwan’s first female president issued a statement saying that the development of cross-strait relations must be based on “four musts,” including that China “must handle cross-strait differences peacefully, on the basis of equality, instead of using suppression and intimidation to get Taiwanese to submit.”

In her New Year message on January 1, she had already unveiled those “four musts,” which also require that China must recognize the island’s existence, respect its freedom and democracy and only communicate through government-authorized channels.

But if such demands in her New Year message were her own – or her Democratic Progressive Party’s – position, after Xi’s remarks, they have constituted the “Taiwan consensus” because the vast majority of Taiwanese would now agree with her “four musts.”

In her January 2 statement as well as during her press conference with foreign media three days later, she urged all political parties in Taiwan to reject Xi’s “one country, two systems” proposal and the “1992 consensus.” They positively responded to her call.

Three opposition parties, namely the People First Party (PFP), the Taiwan Solidarity Union (TSU) and the New Power Party (NPP), backedher stance against Beijing’s “one country, two systems” proposition – a framework under which Hong Kong has operated since Britain returned it to Chinese rule in 1997.

Even the pro-Beijing and main opposition Kuomintang (KMT), the party behind the 1992 consensus, publicly rejected Xi’s inclusion of the “one country, two systems” framework as part of the consensus and his “one country, two systems” proposal as a whole because it lacked public support.

Tsai and her DPP lost ground to the KMT in the local elections in November. There were even calls within her party and pro-Taiwan independence groups for her not to run for a second term in 2020. But her prompt, firm and unequivocal response to Xi’s speech has now certainly strengthened her authority and policies.

Sympathy for Taiwan

Though no country or international organization has publicly responded to her call to speak up on Taiwan’s behalf, internationally people will now sympathize more with the island. After all, like it or not, Taiwan is a de facto independent country with its own democratically elected government, currency, military and foreign policy. Its flourishing democracy has – as pointedly observed by two US presidents, Barack Obama and George W Bush – become a shining example for the region and the world.

The mere fact that the Chinese leader overtly threatened to use force to integrate the island, which the communist regime in Beijing has never ruled, has already made people more receptive to Taiwan and more critical of China.

On this reading, it’s clear that Xi’s forceful statement on January 2 was unwise and counterproductive. It has made Taiwan’s peaceful reunification with China even more distant.

In fact, as already noted, such a reunification, which is central to Xi’s Chinese Dream, is very unlikely, if not impossible, under his regime, which is regressive at home and assertive abroad.

In her press briefing with foreign journalists last Saturday, Tsai plainly said the Taiwanese people cannot accept the “one country, two systems” model for three simple reasons: that “China lacks a democratic system, has a poor human rights record, and has never renounced the use of force against Taiwan.”

Asia Times is not responsible for the opinions, facts or any media content presented by contributors. In case of abuse, click here to report.

*Xuan Loc Doan - Dr Xuan Loc Doan researches and writes on a number of areas. These include Vietnam’s domestic and foreign policy, ASEAN, EU, UK’s politics and international politics in the Asia-Pacific region.

Widodo puts Islam front and center ahead of polls

Indonesian leader's running mate Islamic cleric has neutralized an extremist threat to his campaign, though critics say to the detriment of issues more crucial to voters

By JOHN MCBETH | Asia Times

To no one’s surprise, conservative cleric Ma’ruf Amin, the 75-year-old running mate forced on President Joko Widodo at the nomination deadline, is proving to be little more than a passenger as Indonesia edges toward simultaneous legislative and presidential elections in April.

Amin is likely to be even more so if Widodo is re-elected, although minorities fret over what influence he might try to bring to bear on such issues as the potentially disastrous Halal Bill – or worse, if something ever happens to a seemingly healthy president.

In the end, analysts may argue that although Amin won’t likely win Widodo any more votes, he at least has arrested a threatened deterioration in support among the conservative Islamic community, which drove the president to seek a running mate with religious credentials in the first place.

For some, Amin has already served his purpose by dividing the so-called 212 Movement, the conservative coalition which brought down Jakarta governor Basuki “Ahok” Purnama in early 2017 and which had set its extremist sights on Widodo as well.

Amin helped found the protest movement, then saying its job was done after Purnama was jailed for blasphemy, he walked away. He now claims to regret sending the popular governor to prison, explaining in self-serving piety that the law was simply following its course.

For all that, the 212 Movement already appeared to be disintegrating, initially losing hardline Islamic Defenders Front (FPI) leader Rizieq Shihab, who fled into self-exile in Saudi Arabia in mid-2017 to avoid criminal charges he claimed were politically-inspired.

Even spokesman Kapitra Ampera, once an attorney for Shihab and also Tommy Suharto, ex-president Suharto’s youngest son, has left to become a parliamentary candidate for Widodo’s ruling Indonesian Democratic Party for Struggle (PDI-P) in the southern Sumatran province in Riau.

Azyumardi Azra, head of the graduate school at Indonesia’s State Islamic University, asserts that 212 – named after a mass anti-Purnama rally in Jakarta on December 2, 2016 – was more a political movement than a religious one and was always destined to drift apart.

For all the concerns at the time, it was difficult to see how the factors that conspired to drag down an ethnic Chinese Christian governor in the cauldron of the country’s biggest city could be replicated across a much wider national stage.

As the former president of Nahdlatul Ulama, Indonesia’s and the world’s largest Muslim organization, and also the serving chairman of the influential Indonesian Ulema Council (MUI), the nation’s top clerical body, Amin may have unmatched religious credentials.

But the son of a little-known west Java religious scholar has seen his career shaped as much by his prowess as an Islamic politician as by his expertise in Islamic law. With that has come a deft ability to shift with the political winds.

Bringing together disparate Islamic groups and parties earned Amin a local leadership role in NU, which now boasts 45 million card-carrying members, and eventually a seat in the Jakarta provincial assembly in 1971, a position he held for the next 11 years.

The strongman Suharto regime removed him as a prospective national candidate for the United Development Party (PPP), the party NU was forced to amalgamate with in 1973, and it was not until the long-serving president’s fall in 1998 that Amin returned to practical politics.

Amin won a seat for NU’s newly formed National Awakening Party (PKB) in the first post-Suharto democratic elections in 1999, but he quit parliament in 2004 after a falling out with pluralist ex-president Abdurrahman Wahid, a descendent of one of NU’s founders.

Azra calls Amin an opportunist who, as an adviser to ex-president Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono, was responsible for pushing a succession of edicts and policies that led to an alarming slide in Indonesia’s reputation for religious tolerance between 2008 and 2014.

Indonesians are intrigued how the man who habitually wears sandals and sarongs will tackle economic and other worldly matters in planned televised debates with millennial tycoon Sandiaga Uno, opposition candidate Prabowo Subianto’s running mate.

Certainly, he will be a persuasive voice against campaigners seeking to cast Widodo as un-Islamic and a closet communist, but most polls show he has had little overall impact on Widodo’s popularity, which remains above 50% compared with Prabowo’s 28-29% in opinion polls.

Indeed, in one recent survey Widodo actually loses 1.5% with Amin on board, while among younger voters the gap is 8-10%. But that belies other political realities, particularly in the two bastions of Islamic conservatism – Banten and neighboring West Java, Indonesia’s most populous province.

Widodo lost heavily there in 2014, two of five provinces where rival Prabowo emerged triumphant. In Banten, Amin’s home province, Widodo currently trails 58.7% to 39% and may slip even further depending on his response to the recent Krakatau tsunami disaster.

But Amin is little known in Banten’s staid Islamic community. He left there with his parents at an early age to study at the influential Tebuiring boarding school in Jombang, East Java, which was established by NU founder Hasyim Asy’ari in the late 1890s.

In the main battleground of West Java, where the president is determined to win, different political factors, including the support this time of the second-ranked Golkar Party and also reformist provincial governor Ridwan Kamil, a Widodo ally, give the incumbent a narrow lead.

Widodo began courting Amin soon after the Purnama affair wound down, but he did not consider him as a running mate until his allies in the ruling coalition rejected his preferred choice, former Constitutional Court chief justice Mohammad Mahfud MD, who they feared had political ambitions of his own.

Leading that revolt were PDI-P leader Megawati Sukarnoputri, who sees her daughter, human development coordinating minister Puan Maharani, 45, as a prospective candidate in 2024, and ambitious PKB chairman Muhaimin Iskander, 52, deputy head of the People’s Consultative Assembly (MPR).

Ironically, while Prabowo has so far steered clear of primordial issues, perhaps in part because of the money he needs from the ethnic Chinese business community for his cash-strapped campaign, it is the Widodo government which has taken the offensive.

During a national meeting last November, the Indonesian Mosque Council (IMC), headed for a second five-year term by Vice-President Jusuf Kalla, issued an edict that the country’s 800,000 mosques should not be used for political activities.

While Azra doubts its ability to enforce the directive, it is a clear effort to stop places of worship from becoming points of opposition mobilization, as they were during the anti-Purnama campaign when Kalla, ironically enough and to Widodo’s chagrin, supported winning candidate Anies Baswedan.

Although it attracted little media attention when he was appointed early last year, IMC’s panel of experts includes State Intelligence Agency (BIN) director Budi Gunawan, a member of Megawati’s inner circle since he served as her police adjutant.

BIN issued a report at the time of the November meeting warning that 41 mosques in one Jakarta neighborhood alone were preaching extremism and religious intolerance to worshippers, many of whom were government workers.

More recently, PKB – one of the six parties making up the government coalition – expressed support for a suggestion from doctrinaire Acehnese clerics for the presidential candidates to undergo a Koranic recitation test, which Prabowo might struggle with as the only Muslim in a family of Christians.

What worries critics is that the preoccupation with religion ignores the fact that elections should be fought on issues that affect the everyday life of Indonesians, who still pay more for rice than any other Association of Southeast Asian Nation (ASEAN) citizen and have now been told that their tsunami warning system has fallen into disrepair.

Amin seems to encapsulate all that, a prospective vice-president whose real-world experience is confined to Islamic banking and little else.  Azra said: “People are worried not only about his health [he has heart problems and tires easily], but his lack of expertise in anything outside religion.”

-- Photo: Indonesian President Joko Widodo prays during Nuzulul Quran event at Presidential Merdeka Palace in Jakarta, Indonesia on June 5, 2018. Photo: NurPhoto via AFP Forum