China’s space program, past,
present, and future
China’s space program dates back
to the 1950s, when China first started developing its own missiles, modeled on
those of the USSR, but some would argue that the
space age was actually born in China, citing its use
of “fire arrows” in the 13th century as the first example of rockets. Mao Zedong
himself was impressed by the launch of Sputnik in 1957 and wanted China to move
forward quickly in the development of satellites. But these plans were
postponed and it was not until 1970 that China launched its first small
satellite, long after the United States and Russia.
An ambitious program, including
the launch of astronauts to space, was approved by Mao Zedong, Prime Minister
Zhou Enlai, and Minister of Defense Lin Biao in 1970, but, in the turbulent
political context of the 1970s, it was canceled in 1978 by Deng Xiaoping, who
was back to power. Deng had a very pragmatic view of the interest of space and
focused the Chinese space program on practical applications, leading to the
launch of the first Chinese telecommunications satellite in 1984. Since then
China has successfully developed civilian and military applications, including
telecommunications, remote sensing, meteorology, and navigation. However, with
the rising geopolitical posture of the country, more prestige-oriented
projects, in lunar and deep space exploration, and human spaceflight, were
promoted in the 1990s, including the approval, in September 1992, of an orbital
space station as the main goal of the program.
As a result, despite China’s late
entry into space exploration – the first Chinese astronaut was not sent into
space until 2003 – it has caught up lately at an impressive rate. By 2017,
11 taikonauts (a term used for Chinese astronauts) had
successfully orbited the Earth, demonstrating China’s
growing participation in space. In 2013, China landed the
Jade Rabbit rover on the moon, representing the first
time that a robot had landed on the moon’s surface in nearly half a century.
However, China’s record in space
has not consistently been impressive, with the most notorious instance of
irresponsible space activity being the
2007 anti-satellite (ASAT) test. According to official
Chinese media, the test was defensive in nature. Yet in reality it was meant
to
test China’s ability to destroy satellites, which several
militaries – and most notably the American military – depend on for
communications and geolocation information. While successful in destroying one
of its own weather satellites, this act has jeopardized China’s future
cooperation prospects with other states. The ASAT test was highly contentious,
as it produced a massive amount of space debris, endangering many other
nations’ space assets. Altogether the test
reinforced suspicionsabout China’s intentions in outer
space.
Contemporary Assets and Policies
of China
Unlike in other countries, but
like in the Soviet Union in the past, China’s space program and its military
are essentially the same entity. Despite China’s ongoing exclusion from the
International Space Station (ISS) – due to U.S. opposition – it currently
possesses many impressive space assets. In 2016, China achieved a record number
of rocket launches. These included seven “Long March” rockets, including the
maiden flight of the
Long March 5 in November 2016. The new rocket is
capable of ferrying 25 metric tons (MT) of cargo into low-Earth orbit (LEO),
putting it on a par with the Delta IV Heavy and Europe’s Ariane V rockets and
doubling the payload which China is able to place in space. Also in 2016, in
June, China launched a new Long March 7 rocket, which is the
“middle child” in the country’s arsenal of launchers,
sitting between the heavier Long March 5 and the lighter Long March 6. Progress
continued,
despite some setbacks, in 2017, including China’s first
launch of a cargo spacecraft using a
Long
March 7 Y2 rocket in April.
The proposed Long March 9 aims to
increase payload to 140 MT for LEO, meaning that China should be able to
operate large human and cargo mission and carry spacecraft within the
next five to seven years. China also has its own spacecraft
– known as
Shenzhou – modeled on the Russian Soyuz vehicles,
which has served as the primary mechanism for transporting taikonauts into
and out of space, but is now due for replacement.
China also operates its own
navigation satellite system – known as
BeiDou – providing regional coverage over China and
the Asia-Pacific, with accuracy of up to
ten centimeters. Aside from providing accurate geolocation
information for Chinese weapon systems and communication coverage for its
military various forms of information, users of
BeiDou, which include the
Pakistani military, can take advantage of a short-message
service not possible with the U.S. GPS.
Another of China’s activities in
space involves
monitoring space debris using a tracking system. This
strategy is an important aspect in repairing trust transnationally and
demonstrating a commitment to the responsible and secure use of space,
following the 2007 ASAT test. The Chinese Space Debris Monitoring and
Application Center, which is part of the China National Space Administration,
is tracking space debris with
a
special focus on the smallest pieces – those which are smaller than
one centimeter and of which there are around 100 million. In 2015, China
also
launched a space junk monitoring center to protect its
spacecraft in orbit.
China’s objectives as part of its
outer space endeavors are declaredly defensive. According to a 2015
white papercalled “China’s Military Strategy 2015,” China’s
military policy is one of active defense and its intention is to secure its
spot in space for peaceful purposes, such as space exploration, supporting the
economy, and developing technology.
In 2015, at the Conference on
Disarmament in Geneva, China, along with Russia, proposed an updated version of
the “Treaty on the prevention of the placement of weapons in Outer Space, the
threat or use of force against outer space objects (CD/1985).” The Russian-led
proposal, known as the “
no first placement” initiative, calls on nations not to
deploy weapons in space. This resolution is nonbinding and intended more as a
method to even the space-warfare playing field, rather than for altruistic
peaceful purposes.
Some see China’s rapid expansion
into space as a necessary step to
change the military balance on Earth and defend its
policies. By strengthening its military with space technologies (which boost
military capabilities by improving communications and geolocation services),
China is better placed better to defend against potentially aggressive
behavior.
Future of the Chinese Space
Program
In December 2016, China released
a
white
paper detailing its plans to expand the “strength and size” of its
space program. The nation plans to increase the estimated
$6 billion per year it currently invests in space
activities, in order to fund numerous proposed initiatives. The plan outlines a
robotic lunar program made up of several missions. These include the aim of
becoming the
first country to soft land a probe on the far side of
the moon (planned for this year) and the launch of the
Chang’e-5 lunar probe – a technically complex process
in which the probe will land, collect samples, return to a docking in lunar
orbit, and then come back to Earth. On the surface, these missions appear
largely scientific and they do indeed improve China’s capacity to explore
deeper into space. However, the routinization of precision maneuvering in space
also has military implications, as the technology required for such endeavors
parallels the skills needed for military operations in space. These include
defensive skills, such as repairing and maintaining satellites.
In addition, China’s BeiDou
navigation system is on course to provide global coverage using
35 satellites by 2020. In September 2016, China sent
its second space laboratory into orbit –
Tiangong 2 – after it was announced that the Chinese
National Space Administration had lost control of its predecessor – Tiangong 1
– and that it would
reenter the Earth’s atmosphere in March 2018. The
launch of Tiangong 2 was in preparation for the establishment of a
permanent
manned space station by 2022, finally implementing the goal approved
30 years before. The space station is being constructed at a fast pace and is
scheduled for launch into orbit in 2020. With the potential retirement of the
ISS after 2025, other countries could feasibly rely on China for space
research, if it becomes the
only country with a space station.
Recently, China became the first
country to begin testing on a
quantum-enabled satellite, which aims to investigation
hack-proof communication keys using quantum encryption. If successful, this
technology could be upscaled to create a hack-proof satellite communication
network, which would naturally have great security implications, in light of
the increasing threat posed by cyberattacks to communications infrastructure. This
initiative, along with those mentioned previously, is clearly in line with
China’s goal of becoming a
global science and technology leader.
China’s tactics indicate
President Xi Jinping’s strong ambitions to transform the nation into the next
space power and to strengthen Chinese military capabilities at a rapid pace,
while helping legitimize the regime on Earth. In the near future we could
feasibly see a leveling of the outer space playing field between several major
powers, or potentially the shifting of the current power in a new direction. After
all, China is not the only regional space player.
Japan maintains a highly sophisticated space program,
and
India is also developing lunar and deep-space
capacities, albeit with less media attention.
Concerns over China’s role in
outer space were also expressed poignantly in a
testimony by James Lewis of the Center for Strategic
and International Studies before the House Space Science and Technology in
September 2016. China was fast consolidating its position as a top space power
in the world, pursuing several largescale projects simultaneously –
although still spending less than the United States and Russia on space. However,
Lewis’ testimony expressed an already familiar concern: besides a few short
white papers, there is a lack of transparency in China’s military space
programs and its release of technical information is scarce compared to what
NASA or the European Space Agency provide.
The problem of
trust has
already surfaced between the United States and China, and the lack of
transparency in outer space affairs risks further straining the relations
between the two powers. More generally, it can set a precedent for other
nations too, which may feel more inclined to be more secretive about their intentions
on space.
*Professor Nayef Al-Rodhan is
an Honorary Fellow at St Antony’s College, University of Oxford, and Senior
Fellow and Head of the Geopolitics and Global Futures Program at the Geneva
Center for Security Policy. He is the author of Meta-Geopolitics of Outer
Space: An Analysis of Space Power, Security and Governance(Basingstoke:
Palgrave Macmillan, 2012). Follow him on Twitter: @SustainHistory
Photo: Shenzhou 9 spacecraft
rocket launches from the Jiuquan Satellite Launch Center in China (June 16,
2012).
Image Credit: AP Photo/Ng Han Guan
